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INTRODUCTION
ANY MYTHS SURROUND ORIGINALISM: IT IS EXCLUSIVE TO THE CONSTITU-

tion of the United States; it is inherently conservative; it is an enemy to constitutional change and relevance. In this article, I intend
to challenge those assumptions by analyzing sixty years of originalist constitutional adjudication in Puerto Rico.
Originalism in Puerto Rico has never been formally adopted, but it has always been there. Three elements make Puerto Rican originalism different from
the U.S. experience at the federal level: (i) clear and expansive text; (2) ascertainable original intent accompanied by a broad and encompassing purpose, and (3)
a long list of justiciable socio-economic rights and progressive policy provisions;
hardly what Bork and Scalia had in mind. These three elements are not exclusive
to Puerto Rico; on the contrary, they are shared by many modern constitutional
systems.
. In Puerto Rico, bright-line rules are hardly conservative. Puerto Rican
originalism is inherently progressive. The end result is a curious one: on the one
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hand, courts are limited in their discretion as to what the text means and requires. This is achieved through clear and specific text. On the other hand, the
constraintplaced uponjudges is not synonymous with conservative valucs, narrow
decisions, or judicialself-restrainton policy matters. The text of the Puerto Rican
Constitution, while limiting the choices available to judges as to where to go, also
forces them to go very far down the constitutionallyprescribed road. The constraint placed upon judges does not entail constraint as to the extent of their
intervention. Quite the opposite: the text and history require more and deeper
judicial intervention into policy matters. As such, the classic dichotomy between
originalist restraint and living constitutionalist activism is destroyed: the constitutional text forces judges to intervene. In that sense, the "activist" approach
would be to refrain from intervening. "Activism" is not synonymous with "interventionism."
That is the curious case of Puerto Rican originalism: it forces courts to intervene in the name of constraint. The more a constitution says, the broader the
scope of a court's obligation to intervene; the clearer the text, the less room for
maneuvering courts have; the greater the reach of the text, the deeper the extent
of the judicial intervention.
In Part I, I analyze a recent case study in Puerto Rican case law that introduces Puerto Rican originalism. In Part II, I discuss the main ingredients of substantive constitutionalism with emphasis on clear text, authoritative history, and
progressive policy provisions, and then I analyze the methodologies of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico as to these matters. In Part III, I offer a few final
thoughts.
I.

STARTING AT THE END: A CASE STUDY

A. AAR's Misleading Siren Song and the Apparent Recent Discovery of
Originalismin PuertoRico
In 2013, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico issued a 5-4 decision upholding
the constitutionality of a statute that limited adoptions to opposite-sex, married
couples, denying the claim of a woman who wanted to adopt her same-sex partner's daughter.' The plaintiffs argued that the classification was subject to strict
scrutiny under the Constitution's express prohibition on discrimination on the
basis of sex.2 The question before the Court was: Are gender and sexual orientation protected under the sex discrimination prohibition provision? The Court
split down the middle, with the more progressive justices answering yes and the
more conservative justices holding the opposite view.
What is interesting about AAR is not the ideological split among the members of the Court as to the substantive issue of gay rights but the apparentdiffer-

I

AAR, ex parte, 187 DPR 835 (2013).
P.R. CONST. art. II, § 1. All classifications expressly identified in this provision are subject to
strict scrutiny, including sex.
2
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ences in their methodological approaches to constitutional adjudication. A U.S.
audience might guess that the more right-wing justices adopted a textualist,
originalist, and restrained approach to judging, while the more progressive judges appealed to modern values, living organism analogies, and text updating. And
they would seem to be right, but even then only partially, for AAR is the exception to the rule; an anomaly, and a misleading one at that. In Puerto Rico,
originalism has been used since the beginning of the constitutional era and it has
a distinctively progressive, left-wing character.
The main thrust of the majority opinion in AAR was on classic separation of
powers grounds: it is up to the democratically elected legislature to set public
policy. The Court must acknowledge its limited role in democratic selfgovernance. Unless the Constitution requires a different result, it is up to the
political branches to decide how best to govern.
After citing the constitutional text, the Court cited the official report issued
by the Commission on the Bill of Rights of the Puerto Rican Constitutional Convention.3 The Court stated that the report "made clear that the purpose of this
constitutional provision is to recognize that women are now fully realized in the
eyes of the law and that they have equal opportunities with respect to men."4
The Court also cited from a book written by the President of the Constitutional
Convention, Antonio Fern6s-Isern, who was also the Resident Commissioner in
Congress representing Puerto Rico. His book was a sort of report to Congress
that detailed what the Constitutional Convention had done and why.5 In AAR,
the majority referenced the book as an authority on the meaning, purpose, and
scope of the textual prohibition contained in Article II, Section i. The Court stated that Fern6s-Isern reached the "same conclusion" as the Bill of Rights Com6
mission's Report as to the purposebehind the sex discrimination prohibition.
The Court held that the purpose of the constitutional prohibition, as revealed by the aforementioned sources, was to eliminate discrimination against
women. This purpose could be further elaborated to "avoid that our legal system
creates classifications based on incorrect, traditionaland stereotypicalsubjective
assumptions that emanate from a male view that -consciously or unconsciouslyis founded on a conception and characterization of women as the 'weaker sex.-'"
In a final analysis, the objective of the provision was to "destroy .. . the founda8

tions of patriarchy."

3

AAR, 187 DPR at 865.

4

Id. (emphasis added) (translation by the author).

ANTONIO FERNOS-ISERN, ORIGINAL INTENT IN THE CONSTITUTION OF PUERTO Rico: NOTES AND
5
COMMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (2nd ed. 2002).

6

AAR, 187 DPR at 866 (translation by the author).

7

Id. (emphasis added) (translation by the author).

8

Id. (translation by the author).
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The Court characterized the plaintiffs' argument as proposing that it "turn
'sex' and 'gender' into synonyms."9 As such, the Court needed to ascertain the
semantic meaning of sex. It quoted a 1995 Report issued by the Judicial Branch
that addressed gender and sex discrimination in the court system, which included distinct definitions of sex and gender.1o As a result, the Court held that sex
and genderwere not the same thing, and applied this distinction to a text adopted

in 1952. This was an obvious temporal misalignment that clashed with originalism."
Since the Constitutional Convention had only prohibited discrimination on
the basis of sex -not mentioning gender-, and since we now know that gender is
not synonymous with sex -although a modern definition of the term was used-,
that must mean that the prohibition established in the Constitution does not
include gender. Relying on the previously identified original purpose of the
clause, the Court held that the scope of the textual command did not extend to
discrimination on account of sexual orientation:
It is not an honest intellectual exercise to pretend that the clause that prohibits
discrimination on account of sex, with its clear history and its purpose to eliminate archaicnotions on the role of women in our society, includes, by osmosis,

discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. History simply demonstrates a
different purpose of the clause.'2
The majority opinion then focused its guns on the dissent, claiming that
they had suggested that the "meaning of the word 'sex' in the Constitution had
changed with the passage of time."3 This is where it gets interesting. The dissenting justices attempted to sustain their positions both by engaging in
originalist methodologies and by employing living constitutionalism rhetoric.
But by emphasizing the latter over the former, they fell into the majority's trap:
the Court is divided, the majority claimed, between those who are faithful to the
constitutional text and history, including the original intent, purpose, and interpretation of the founders, and those who want to ignore those binding sources
and substitute the Founders' will with their personal views on gay rights by hiding behind the liberal faqade of living constitutionalism and claiming that the
meaning of the words in the Constitution is subject to change.
Of course, the Court defended itself from the charge that it was favoring
mummification of the Constitution:

9

Id. (translation by the author).

1o Id. The Report defined sex as a biological term, while gender was a social-historical construction, which included expected behavior.
n1 This seems inconsistent with original public meaning originalism, which looks to contemporaneous sources of meaning to ascertain the semantic content of words. By citing a 1995 report, the
Court puts originalism on its head, using currentmeanings to identify originalsemantic content.
12

Id. at 869 (emphasis added) (translation by the author).

13

Id. at 870 (translation by the author).
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It is not that our Supreme Law is a "prisoner of time" like the dissenters claim,
but the key to change the meaning of the text is not in the hands of the Justices
of the Supreme Court ....
[Ilt is surprising that some members of this Court openly propose a theory of interpretation that would allow judges to decide that the meaning of the Constitution has undergone a metamorphosis with the passage of time. What legitimacy
do nine lawyers who are privileged to wear robes in this honorable institution
have to tell the People of Puerto Rico that the meaning of their lex superior has
changed?'4
The majority stressed the difference between interpreting the Constitution and
changing the meaning of its text. Finally, the opinion ended where it began:
"[t]hejudicialBranch does not rule under our system.'5
It is difficult to maintain that the majority opinion actually engaged in
originalist interpretation. It was the majority that engaged in metamorphosis
when they used current sources to identify the communicative content of words
used in 1952. By doing so, they failed to see that the actual semantic meaning of
sex in 1952 probably included definitions that are now considered to be related
to gender. Yet, they held on to the originalist label because of its powerful appeal.
The dissent attempted an originalist defense of its position, although it
could have done so much more. It retreated to a seemingly exclusive living constitutionalist approach to meaning, when it was actually disguising originalist
argumentswith living constitutionalistrhetoric. In this sense, it would seem that
the conservative justices said they were being originalists, when in fact they employed living constitutionalist tools while the progressive justices said they were
living constitutionalists, when in fact they actually applied the originalist model.
This mix-up can be attributed to the historical correlation made in the U.S. between originalism and conservatism.
Chief Justice Herndndez Denton, one of the historic voices in favor of living
constitutionalism, led the charge:
In order for the constitutional command to be viable across the generations, we
have to accommodate the legal system so that it corresponds with the extralegal, social reality.

I dissent from a judicial insularism based on the notion that our Constitution has to be interpreted in the context in which it was adopted more than
sixty years ago, as if it was an ancient manuscript trapped in a glass urn.'6

14

Id. at 871 (emphasis added) (translation by the author).

Id. at 888 (translation by the author).
Id. at 964-65 (HernAndez Denton, C.J., dissenting) (translation by the author). HernAndez
Denton still attempted an originalist defense, referencing the broad concepts employed by the Con15

16
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Associate Justice Fiol Matta attempted a lukewarm originalist defense of the
progressive position by focusing on the generalpurpose of the sex discrimination
prohibition: "[iun order to interpret what is meant by discrimination on the basis
of sex, we must study the ways in which the different sexes, historically, have
been treated unequally, as well as the motives and justifications used to sustain
that unequal treatment." Then she linked gender with sex: "it is evident that
people have been discriminated against on account of sex because they have not
conformed to traditionally and culturally established sexual categories. That's
why we can conclude that discrimination on the basis of gender goes hand in
hand with discrimination on the basis of sex."'8

Finally, Associate Justice Rodriguez Rodriguez took on the originalist rhetoric by quoting from the official report issued by the School of Public Administration of the University of Puerto Rico, which was charged by the Constitutional
Convention with recommending constitutional provisions.s9 According to that
report, the original intent of the Framers was to interpret the Constitution using
living constitutional tools: "[o]ur constitutional clauses are not prisoners of
time."2o

The dissenters in AAR seem to have surrendered the originalist argument as
to the question before the Court. Still, they came back to the originalist road by
quoting the delegates and the Convention reports which either supported a living constitutionalist approach or suggested that the original meaning of the text
included the type of discrimination at issue. However, they chose not to confront the conservative originalism of the majority, contributing to the incorrect
notion that Puerto Rican originalism is inherently conservative, restrictive, and
limited, and, therefore, that progressive results may only be achieved through
living constitutional notions of updating the text and artificially expanding the

stitution that contain general principles. He quoted from the Framers saying that the constitutional
text should be interpreted by courts as broad as possible, in order to fulfill its rights-protective purpose. Id. at 974. Yet his living constitutionalism rhetoric fought back:
We must avoid expressions that fossilize [the Constitution] and turn it into a history museum piece .... [W]e must not allow our Constitution to become obsolete thanks to literal, restrictive and inflexible interpretations that hinder its application to future eventualities and that lead to results contrary to the fundamental values it enshrines.
Id. at 971-72 (translation by the author).

17

Id. at 997 (Fiol Matta, J., dissenting) (translation by the author).

18 Id. (translation by the author) ("Discrimination on account of sexual orientation is a manifestation of discrimination on the basis of gender which, in turn, is a component of discrimination on
account of sex. These three modes of discrimination are prohibited by our Constitution." (translation
by the author)).
19
Curiously, Justice Rodriguez Rodriguez identifies a contradiction in the original intent of the
founders: while they included an express prohibition on discriminating on the basis of sex, some
delegates to the Convention stated that some male-favoring institutions, like the male administration of community property, would still be allowed. See id. at iooi n.2 (Rodriguez Rodriguez, J., dissenting).
20

Id. at 1037 (translation by the author).
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scope of constitutional provisions. But in Puerto Rico, originalism and minimalism are not synonymous.
The majority opinion did not explicitly adopt an originalist ideology. That
was done by Associate Justice Martinez Torres' concurring opinion, which included twelve references to Antonin Scalia.1 He blasted the dissenters for their
defense of living constitutionalism, labeling them as activists, and took advantage of their unwillingness to make a solid originalist defense of the controversy before the Court. His description of originalism is a mix of the different
schools that make up that judicial philosophy. Yet, he hints at the mode of
originalism to which he subscribes: constitutional interpretation "in harmony
with the way in which the text was understood by the people who approved and
ratified" the Constitution.- However, he failed to criticize the majority's use of a
1995 Report to give meaning to a concept used in 1952.
Martinez Torres then turned his attention to Article II, Section 19, of the
Constitution which requires courts to reject restrictive theories of interpretation
when it comes to constitutional rights:23 "in every constitutional controversy we
must interpret the words of our Supreme Law profoundly and broadly."24 He
recognized that Section 19 commands that the non-inclusion of rights "does not
mean that everything which cannot be gauged literally from each and every one
of the words used [in the Constitution] is, therefore, devoid of constitutional
protection."25 But, he stresses, this is not a carte blanche for judges to redefine
concepts and add rights that do not exist. Linking originalism with separation of
powers principles, Justice Martinez Torres concludes that "the Constitution of
Puerto Rico does not mention the broader concept of 'gender' and even less so
the subcategory of 'sexual orientation.' The document limited itself to prohibiting discrimination on the narrower category of 'sex,' that is, because one is a
man or a woman."2 6 I think Justice Martinez Torres confuses minimalism with
originalism. Interestingly enough, his concurring opinion, like the opinion of the
Court, appears to have made only superficial research as to the semantic meaning of sex as opposed to gender. It is very likely that the original purpose of the
Framers was to adopt a broad definition of sex that included all forms of discriminations based on stereotypical views as to the conduct of the sexes, including
sexual preferences.

21
Id. at 889 (Martinez Torres,
READING LAW 410 (2012)).
22

J.,

concurring) (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,

Id. at 891 (translation by the author). This seems to be more in tune with original public mean-

ing originalism: "[The Constitution] should be interpreted in such a way as to give its words the
meaning they had when it was adopted and ratified." Id. (translation by the author).
23
"The foregoing enumeration of rights shall not be construed restrictively nor does it contemplate the exclusion of other rights not specifically mentioned which belong to the people in a democ
racy." P.R. CONST. art. II, § 19.

24

AAR, 187 DPR at 896 (Martinez Torres, J., concurring) (translation by the author).

25

Id. (translation by the author).

26

Id. at 898-99 (translation by the author),
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But the story of AAR is only the beginning.
B. Basic Elements of Puerto Rican ConstitutionalAdjudication in General
and of Originalismin Particular
After sixty years of constitutional adjudication, AAR was the first time the
concept of originalism was discussed, or even mentioned, in a Supreme Court
opinion.27 It would seem that, for the first time, lines had been drawn and sides
were being chosen. From AAR on, the Court would split along this methodological line. Yet, appearances can be deceiving.
Since the adoption of the Constitution in 1952, originalism has been at the
forefront of constitutionaladjudicationin Puerto Rico, years before it would become an object of debate in U.S. legal scholarship. Originalism has been used
constantly and repeatedly by the Supreme Court. The thing is that our version of
originalism has a distinct Puerto Rican flavor: its substance is progressive and its
method is one of originalexplication, that is, how the Framers themselves interpreted and constructed their own words.2s Our constitutional design and history
has facilitated a progressive, originalist approach.
First, the text of the Puerto Rico Constitution contains multiple bright-line
rules that remove much of the vagueness typically associated with constitutional
provisions and are also accompanied by expansive language that, in combination
with those same rules, produce strong, broad, and extensive protections of constitutional rights. Let's examine an example.
Does the U.S. Constitution's Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual
punishment require courts to declare the death penalty unconstitutional? The
text of this provision is vague at best, for it only offers a subjective standard: no
objective measurement, no specific rule. As a result, courts would need to embark on an interpretative analysis to discern the semantic meaning behind those
words and then proceed to give them legal content through the process of constitutional construction that builds upon, but should not contradict, the text
itself.
Puerto Rico has dealt with this issue differently. Indeed, its Constitution
does have a general provision that prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.29 It

also has an absolute, textual ban on capital punishment: "[tlhe death penalty
shall not exist."3o This bright-line rule, plus the general language model, produces several results.

27

Luis M. Villaronga, Derecho Constitutional, 64 REV. JUR. UPR 765, 787-88 (1995).

Original public meaning originalism has not been the dominant approach used in Puerto Rico.
On the contrary, it has been original intent and purpose in terms of the original meaning as identified
28

and explained by the Framers themselves. I refer to this type of originalism as original explication. I

thank Professor Larry Solum for his suggestion as to this terminology.
29

P.R. CONST. art. II, §

30

Id. art. II, § 7.

12.
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On the one hand, it creates an unmistakable irreducible core. The vagueness
and general nature of the text in the cruel and unusual provision cannot be used
to justify a narrow construction that would allow the death penalty. The existence of a bright-line, categorical, clear, and absolute command washes away the
possibility that a court might construe the general language too narrowly. The
text speaks for itself.
On the other hand, there is a recognition among the drafters that it is not
wise to only use bright-line rules. This would require an endless list of prohibitions that would, necessarily, be incomplete. So, by complementing the brightline rule with a general language provision, the latter takes a life of its own. By
fortifying and enlarging the core, the penumbra also grows and solidifies. As a
result, the Puerto Rican provision banning cruel and unusual punishments, almost by definition, starts where the specific rule stops, with the end result that
the protection is that much stronger and goes that much farther. This phenomenon permeates the entire Puerto Rican Constitution.
Second, the history behind the text is both clear and broad in its reach.
Modern constitutions tend to differ from the U.S. experience in two crucial ways.
First, they are not remote events in a distant past whose study is more in the
realm of history than law. On the contrary, they are recent processes that created vast amounts of accessible and intelligible records full of detail, explanations
and content. Second, their constitution-making process was a central aspect of
national identity and social alignment. As such, all eyes of the polity were focused on the process itself, shifting the center of attention from the ratification
process to the actual drafting. The people were not merely passive ratifiers of the
work done by others; they were active participants in the drafting process,
whether by (1) electing the delegates who, as part of their selection, publicized
their constitutional proposals for popular analysis; (2) generating the political
and social forces that gave life to the Constitution itself; (3) directly proposing
specific provisions to the constitution-making body, or (4) actively engaging the
process through a constant monitoring of the work done by the drafters. In such
cases, the argument in favor of We the People is more compelling. As a result, the
binding nature of the history of the Constitution becomes inescapable, thus furthering the case for some sort of originalist approach. Again, Puerto Rico is a
good example of this phenomenon.
Because of the nature of the process that created the Constitution of Puerto
Rico, there is a rich and comprehensive record within reach of constitutional
adjudicators. The record is rich in detail, with much elaboration on the purpose,
semantic meaning, and legal content of the adopted provisions. The creation of
the Puerto Rican Constitution was hardly a secret, elusive, or discreet affair. On
the contrary, it was the result of years of debate and consensus among the political and social forces on the island.
When Congress finally authorized the calling for a Constitutional Convention, most of the main political parties in Puerto Rico embarked on a process to
select the candidates and programs they would take to the people. As such, the
process of creating the Constitution began months before the first meeting of

Nfam. 1(2o16)
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the Convention took place. Political parties, labor unions, civic organizations,
and other social movements made the Constitution their top priority and embarked on a prolonged national conversation about what sort ofconstitution was
wanted. As a result, candidates and parties made specific, comprehensive, and
public proposals as to the particular provisions they would take to the Convention, and scrutinized their political rivals' respective proposals. In other words, a
popular and public debate emerged which would culminate, not in the process of
ratification, but in the drafting itself This explains why Puerto Rican originalism
is based more on original intent than original public meaning, as well as focused
on the drafters and not the ratifiers. The combination of these two factors -the
richness of the record and focus on the Framers-, allows for the main articulation of originalism in Puerto Rico: original explication. For example, the work on
the Convention floor generated 2,500 pages of debates among the delegates, who
asked each other questions on what specific provisions meant, whether semantically or relating to their purpose, legal content, or possible future applications.
Through the reports and the debates, the Framers were able to interpret their
own work.
Finally, the work of the Convention was public in nature, through the physical presence of the people in the galleries of the Capitol, individuals and organizations proposing provisions directly to the Convention, and through the media's constant narration of daily events. In other words, there is clear, official,
and universally accepted evidence of what the drafters did, why, and what it all
meant. Ascertaining original meaning, intent, and purpose is hardly a difficult
thing. This has resulted in a method in which the Supreme Court searches for
the Framers' original explication of their own words and, after doing this, attempts to interpret that explication. In Puerto Rico, the Framers are the primary
interpreters of the Constitution.
But the story does not end with the availability of sources as an empirical
matter. The nature and content of those sources are also interesting and compelling: unequivocally, the consensus that emerged from the Convention, which is
palpable from the historicalsources, favors a progressive, rights-protective, expansive, broad, and socially oriented approach to the Constitution and its future
interpretation and application. Not only can we ascertain intent, purpose, and
meaning with ease, but also expressly reject a narrow, minimalist or conservative
view of the Constitution.
Third, the Constitution not only has bright-line rules and broad language
that result in a progressive text and clear, identifiable intent and purpose of an
expansive nature, but it also contains substantive clements that force Courts to
intervene in areas typically reserved exclusively for the elected branches. This
substantive content comes in two modes. First, through the inclusion of a comprehensive and non-exhaustive list of justiciable socioeconomic rights, which
can be either individual or collective, positive or negative, and opposable both to
state action and private parties. This creates a seemingly endless source of constitutional adjudication that requires judicial intervention in many aspects of
social life. Second, aside from rights protection, the Constitution also contains
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provisions that convey binding public policy. That is, the Constitution itself
adopts public policy provisions that are binding on the political branches and
that, if they fail to follow or obey them, can be vindicated in the courts. These
provisions cover a wide range of areas, like labor, environmental, and even economic preferences. These constitutionally entrenched public policy preferences,
combined with rich socioeconomic rights, reveal a program and an ideology underneath the Constitution itself, which form an inherent part of it. Labor rights
are a great example of this phenomenon.
Constitutionalized socioeconomic rights are different from the classic catalogue of political and civil rights in older constitutions. These rights are not just
positive rights that create an obligation on behalf of the state, but are actually
negative rights operational in the private economic sector. Finally, because of
their structural organization, they form a constitutionally ranked public policy
that cannot be ignored by courts in the process of adjudication. From statutory
interpretation to evaluation of policy decisions made by the legislature, courts
are called upon to implement these constitutional public policy provisions as
part of their judicial role.
All of this creates a comprehensive role for courts in constitutionaldemocratic self-governance. By entrenching so many rights and policy choices in
the Constitution, the People are governing themselves, refusing to settle for
plain-old legislative self-governance through representative and ordinary politics. They are recruiting courts to help them in that endeavor by guaranteeing
that the popular will expressed in the Constitution is not thwarted by the hijacking of the legislative process. This brings us to a critical distinction relating to
the nature and types of modern Constitutions. I will now discuss what I consider
to be the ideal constitutional types as to structure, content, and design that have
direct bearing on issues concerning methods of interpretation and judicial application.
C.

Types of Constitutions:A BlueprintforAdjudication

First, we have framework constitutions3' These tend to be older and associated with the British tradition of constitutional law related to government action
and parliamentary sovereignty. Their goal is to create and kick-start the political
process and leave everything else to it. Framework constitutions maximize selfgovernment by limiting themselves to creating the structures of government and
supplying them with tools to function effectively. Once these structures of political self-governance -especially those of a democratic nature- are set up, then
constitutional law stops and ordinary politics start. The role of the Constitution
is to kick-start politics, not direct it. Society is not to be organized by the Constitution, but through it. Framework constitutions create the organism of government and, once life has been given to it, the structural constitution takes a step

31

Also known as statutory, organicor procedural.
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back. Commonwealth countries tend to have these types of constitutions, Australia being a prime example of a pure framework constitution.
Second, we have liberaldemocraticframework constitutions.The U.S. constitutional text fits this category, although it actually started out as a regular
framework constitution. The adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791 changed its
nature, although some liberal democratic elements were already present in Article I. These constitutions add to the basic framework of government set up by
the organic text, by including individual liberties and political rights. In turn,
these rights have two relevant features: (i) they tend to focus on individual political rights, and (2) they are inherently related to the idea of a framework constitution. As political rights, they are lacking in substantive content and are directly
related to the actual functioning of the political institutions. By creating individual political rights, democratic self-rule is fortified. Depending on their specific
content and construction, liberal democratic constitutions can be low intensity
(U.S.) or high intensity (Germany). This distinction focuses on how and why liberal democratic provisions are applied. If they are used mostly for their role in
guaranteeing democratic self-governance, they are low intensity. However, if
they acquire independentsubstantive content and are combined to create binding
constitutionalprinciples and policy, they are high intensity.
Third, we have teleological constitutions.32 Their main articulation is the
substantive model. These are associated with the so-called second wave of rights,
which are socioeconomic in nature and the result of the Second World War.
Recognizing the insufficiencies of merely letting loose the instruments of ordinary politics or complementing them with political rights, teleological constitutions build on the notion that some rights are necessary for the effective functioning of a democratic society. Social and economic inequalities are damaging
to the democratic process: hungry, exploited, and/or illiterate individuals are not
active citizens and are left out of true democratic self-rule. In that sense, they
serve as distant relatives of framework constitutions: the inclusion of socioeconomic rights is part of a design to strengthen democracy. This would correspond
to low intensity modes of this type of constitution, merely expanding the list of
rights necessary to facilitate self-government.
Yet, a mutation has occurred: substantive rights are not adopted merely to
strengthen democracy. A new role for the Constitution has been included: entrenchment of substantive rights serves as a model for the type of society the
People want to build. Why leave certain important policy choices to ordinary
politics, where they can be corrupted, weakened, or temporarily deprived? The
success of entrenchment obtained by liberal democratic constitutions convinced
people to entrench not just basic political rights, but other rights that directly
improve the quality of life itself: substantive rights. These rights tend to be both
individual and collective, social and economic, and opposable both to the state

Most of them are of a social democratic character. Surely, there can be constitutions that en32
trench reactionary commands or laissez-faire principles. Chile is a good example. Yet post-World
War II constitutions that include substantive issues tend to be of a social democratic nature.
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and to other private parties. This corresponds to high level substantive constitutions.
Unlike liberal democratic framework constitutions, teleological constitutions recognize that individuals are not just vulnerable to government abuse;
they are also vulnerable to exploitation by private and economic forces, such as
creditors, employers, landlords, and industrial interests. This is characteristic of
high intensity constitutions like South Africa's. This brings us back to the democratic rationale of substantive rights: if citizens only have political rights in their
constitutions and the rest are up to ordinary politics, powerful private interests
can easily highjack ordinary politics. It is more difficult to highjack constitutionmaking processes where the people's interest are heightened. By ensuring these
substantive rights, the people are able to: (i) better arm themselves for the democratic fight, and (2) remove from ordinary politics those rights that are so important as not to be trusted to ordinary politics, where economic forces are
stronger.
Finally, we have ideological constitutions. Substantive constitutions are the
natural offspring of liberal democratic constitutions. In their low intensity form,
they seek the amplification of rights that strengthen democratic self-rule. In
their high intensity form, they entrench socioeconomic rights because they possess independent substantive content beyond their relation to the political process. In both models, they continue where the liberal democratic constitutions
left off. Ideological constitutions are, in turn, the natural offspring of substantive
constitutions. Once you establish and entrench substantive rights, a picture of
the type of society you want to create starts to emerge. Labor rights, environmental protection, right to health care access, and so on, are not just isolated
rights: they make up a blueprint for society. At some point, the Constitution is
not merely laying out rights or facilitating self-government; instead, the Constitution is substantively organizingsociety.
Through ideological constitutions, the way forward is not left primarily to
ordinary politics or legislative judgment. The Constitution points the way, leaving to ordinary politics the details of that journey. These constitutions do not
limit themselves to containing ordinary politics or recognizing more individual
rights. On the contrary, they tend to: (1) be very specific, and (2) actively guide
ordinary politics. Under this type of constitution, broad and general language is
not vague or empty; on the contrary, they carry enormous ideological weight.
Compare equal protection of the laws to the dictatorshipof the proletariator the
teachings of Ataturk. All are equally open-ended and broad, but the latter two
carry ideological content that reigns over a vast domain. These constitutions
tend to be the result of a revolutionary process, be it independence (nationalism,
religion, or identity), social transformation (a socialist revolution or capitalist
restoration), or democratic transition (the end of apartheid or of colonialism).
Aside from an ever-growing, detailed yet expansive array of individual and collective rights, ideological constitutions entrench within the text and structure of
the Constitution itself public policy choices and preferences, as well as actual
commands and principles relating to the economic system and social organiza-
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tion. The new constitutions of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador are manifestations of this trend in modern constitutionalism. The Portuguese Constitution of
1974 was crucial in the development of this trend.
This summary of my proposed typology is not meant to be either/or. The
types of constitutions I have proposed are not closed-off from each other. On the
contrary, I have emphasized their connections and interactions. Most modern
constitutions are, for the most part, eclectic, yet can be analyzed so as to catalogue them within the suggested typology. Also, the notion of low intensity and
high intensity versions of these types reinforce the idea that there are blurred
lines between them. But, the typology is still useful, for it identifies the nature
and effect of the theory of constitutional adjudication that is adopted in a particular place. An originalist in the U.S. hardly resembles an originalist in Chile or
Bolivia. Yet, their methodological approaches are similar. But by recognizing the
different types of constitutions, we can better understand the justifications,
function, and repercussions of originalism around the world.
Framework constitutions tend to be free of major policy considerations,
written in vague and open-ended ways, and are not accompanied by a publiclyempowered authoritative drafting history. Teleological constitutions, typically of
a social-democratic, post-liberal or radical bent, tend to be, simultaneously,
more specific and more expansive in their reach. I believe there is a common
thread between constitutions that: (1) contain clear and expansive text; (2) bring
with them an inseparable history of creation and explanation, and (3) purposefully entrench policy choices in the constitutional structure: a modern distrustof
ordinarypolitics, especially of representative democracy through legislative governance. The logic behind the (1) use of vague, general, and open-ended provisions, (2) the secondary nature of the original process of making a constitution,
and (3) the omission of substantive or policy issues in the constitution is that the
political process kick-started by the adoption of the Constitution will adequately
fill in the gaps. That is the basis of the distinction between constitutional entrenchment and ordinary politics. The more you entrench, whether through
clear text, authoritative history, or through the inclusion of substantive content,
the more you take away from ordinary politics. And while this definitely entails
some risks and problems, like the disruption of democratic self-governance and
the obstruction of democratic change through the ordinary political process, it is
not the product of misinformed or misguided constitution makers.
The fact that many modern constitutions are of the new brand can be seen
as evidence of a generalized mistrust of ordinary politics. These new types of
constitutions serve two important and related purposes: (i) to guard against the
failure of ordinary politics that may occur, particularly in socially unequal polities, and (2) to allow the people to govern themselves, not just through the election of representatives that will govern on their behalf, but through popular enactment of constitutional texts and structures that bypass the indirect aspect of
representative democracy. As a result, courts are invited, recruited, and even
forced to transform their classic judicialfunction and actually become a third
branch of government. When legislative self-governance functions properly, the
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role of the courts will, indeed, be limited. But when the institutions of ordinary
politics fail and frustrate the popular will articulated in the Constitution, then
courts are forced to intervene to restore the balance in favor of popular selfgovernance. When ordinary politics fail, the countermajoritarian issue becomes
irrelevant, because, if there is still popular adherence to the Constitution, courts
will, in fact, be restoring the popular will that was frustrated by the legislative
malfunction. Thus, when implementing constitutional policy commands, courts
are not acting in a countermajoritarian manner. How courts deal with these
types of constitutions becomes critical, because their failure to live up to the
potential of the new constitutions adopted by popular will makes them accomplices in the frustration of that will. If ordinary politics fail, and the courts stand
by passively in the name of judicial restraint or because of separation of powers
concerns, then the failure is complete and the popular will is totally destroyed.
That would be a tragedy of historic proportions. That is why, among other
things, the new trend in constitutionalism requires a re-evaluation of the entire
separation of powers doctrine.
D. Setting the Stagefor Originalism:The Effects of the Three Elements (Text,
History, and Substance) in ConstitutionalAdjudication
Originalists have both a more compelling and, at the same time, challenging
case in teleological constitutions that have these three characteristics (clear and
expansive text; authoritative history that reflects broad purpose; entrenched
socioeconomic rights and policy choices). "Compelling" because it is hard to
ignore clear text and clear original purpose in the context of a constitutionmaking process that was crucial to the polity and in which strong social consensus emerged and was incorporated into the Constitution. A constitutional judge
that ignores clear text and discards the rich history of the constitution-making
process would be very vulnerable to charges of illegitimay.33
Yet all of this comes at a price. Courts will constantly find themselves locking horns with legislatures and, in representative democracies, with temporal
majorities. Sometimes, the people will support their courts because they are
faithfully applying the Constitution that was popularly adopted against a disconnected legislature. But sometimes, the original consensus that made the Constitution may have indeed weakened, and a new consensus may be on the rise. In
those cases, a pure originalist approach may break the constitutional consensus

33 Even the most ardent living constitutionalist cannot evade the two senator rule or the presidential age rule. Now imagine that the Constitution is full of these types of bright-line rules and that
those rules dre: (i) backed-up by strong evidence of purpose and design, and (2) ielated to cutuove-

sial and every day issues like economic policy, labor disputes, abortion, the death penalty and income
distribution.
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and force people to amend or discard the Constitution itself to conform to present values, with all the instability that encompasses.34
In summary, clear text and history limit the discretion of courts but also legitimize their actions. And when that clear text and history is of a rightsexpansive nature and is combined with an array of progressive socioeconomic
rights and entrenched policy choices, the substantive result of constitutional
adjudication through originalist vehicles will produce interventionist courts. But
we could not affirm that courts were being "activist" in those situations. In these
situations, it is the Constitution that is activist and the People who adopted it:
We the People's will be done.
11.

PUERTO Rico: A CASE STUDY

A.

Introduction

Why Puerto Rico? After all, we are talking about a small island in the Caribbean that, as a territory of the U.S., has an almost non-existent role in the international arena. But actually, the Puerto Rican identity crisis exacerbated by colonialism may have something to offer.
First, the U.S. debate has focused for far too long on the federal Constitution. But the U.S. has fifty plus jurisdictions with their own state or local constitutions that, precisely because of their clear text, expansive purpose, and policy
entrenchments, have a lot more to offer people than the bony federal Constitution. In that sense, the Puerto Rican experience can serve as a model for further
development of state constitutional law in the U.S. that transcends the minimalist approach of simply fixing the mistakes of the federal Supreme Court by way
of state constitutional adjudication. If states are really the laboratories of democracy, adequate developments in state constitutional adjudication may be socially
beneficial. I fear that many state constitutions may be severely underutilized
because of the influence of federal case law. Maybe an originalistapproach to
state constitutional law can have positive transformative consequences or, even
in negative situations, force people to pay more attention to state constitutionmaking.35
Second, the Puerto Rican Constitution is not an isolated legal document. It
was part of a world-wide revolution in constitution-making that may yield helpful insight into the development of theories and methods of constitutional adjudication in other countries that, for several reasons, may also be underutilizing
their constitutional potential.

34 See Jorge M. Farinacci Fern6s, The Dormant Commerce Clause and a PublicEconomy: Lessons
for PuertoRico, 47 REV. JUR. UIPR 595 (2013).
35 Many state constitutions, particularly those that were drafted during the Progressive Era, are
very similar to the type adopted in Puerto Rico. This suggests a vast array of research that could be
done in that direction. See Michael Schwaiger, Understandingthe Unoriginal:IndeterminantOriginalism and Independent Interpretationof the Alaska Constitution, 22 ALAsKA L. REV. 293 (2005).
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Until recently, debates about originalism have focused exclusively on the
Constitution of the U.S. The scholarship has slowly but surely begun to turn its
attention towards comparative originalism.3 6 Previously, the academic debate
centered on U.S. originalism. When it came to comparative constitutional law, it
focused mainly on particular issues and results, more than on theory and method. As stated, there has been a movement to dive deeper and analyze how courts
in other countries actually go about the process of constitutional adjudication
from a theoretical and methodological standpoint. The initial results have been
interesting, promising, and potentially revolutionary. In that sense, Puerto Rican
constitutional history and practice offer a bridge between state constitutional
development and transnational comparative law.
After nearly 400 years of Spanish colonialism in Puerto Rico, the U.S. declared war on Spain and invaded the island on July 25, 1898. Spain formally ceded sovereignty over Puerto Rico to the U.S. by way of the Treaty of Paris. From
1898 to 1900, Puerto Rico was under U.S. military rule. In 1900, Congress passed
the Foraker Organic Act that gave Puerto Rico a civilian Government that was
mostly appointed by the President of the U.S. In 1917, Congress passed the Jones
Organic Act that replaced the Foraker Act. For our purposes, the Jones Act
served as the proxy for a local Constitution. Still, power rested with Congress
and the President, who continued to appoint most of the Government. Congress
granted Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship that same year.
When Congress finally authorized Puerto Rico to enact its own Constitution,
the main political parties in Puerto Rico had mixed reactions. On the one hand,
this was an important opportunity to do away with the hated, nakedly colonialist
Jones Organic Act and adopt a Constitution that really addressed the needs and
preferences of the Puerto Rican people, particularly as to individual and collective rights and the setting-up of a locally elected Government. On the other
hand, the move reeked of colonialism with Congress authorizing the People of
Puerto Rico to exercise their sovereignty. Congress also included substantive
conditions that the Constitution must meet, as well as a process of ratification
that called for a supervising role on behalf of Congress.37
To some in Puerto Rico, the latter part was too much to bear. The secondstrongest political party at that moment, the Puerto Rican Independence Party

&

36 See Yvonne Tew, Originalismat Home and Abroad, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 780 (2014); Sujit
Choudhry, Living Originalismin India? "OurLaw" and Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, 25 YALE J.L.
HUMAN. 1 (2013); Ozan 0. Varol, The Origins and Limits of Originalism:A Comparative Study, 44
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1239 (2011); David Fontana, ComparativeOriginalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO
189 (2010); Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2009); INTERPRETING

CONSTITUTIONs: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006).
37 For example, Congress required the adoption of a Bill of Rights. "Presumably, the intent of the
Congress was that the Constitution contain guarantees of fundamental rights which are part of the
American tradition." FERNOS-ISERN, supra note 5, at 33 (emphasis added). As to its supervising role,
there could be a theoretical argument that Congress was actually one of the main ratifiers of the
Constitution. Yet, because of obvious political considerations and because of the inevitable charge of
raw colonialism it would entail, no one has ever suggested to look to Congress' role as a "ratifier."
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(P.I.P.), called for a boycott of the election to the Constitutional Convention due
to its irremediable colonial texture. The other parties -the governing Popular
Democratic Party (P.D.P., known in Spanish as Partido PopularDemocrdtico),
the Puerto Rican Statehood Party (P.S.P., known in Spanish as PartidoEstadista
Puertorriqueiio),and the pro-annexation Socialist Party (S.P., known in Spanish
as PartidoSocialista)- supported the process. The campaign that preceded the
election of the delegates centered on what type of Constitution would be adopted, particularly as to the content of the Bill of Rights, and issues pertaining to
social and economic policy. Some of the main parties even approved electoral
programs that spelled out their main proposals to the Convention for popular
analysis. As such, the election ofthe delegates would be seen as a popularmandate
to write the Constitution in a particularway. This would explain why, after the
adoption of the Constitution in 1952, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico would
focus so heavily on the work of the drafters -including their intentions, purposes, specific examples, and opinions as to the communicative and legal content of
the adopted provisions- instead of the understanding of the people as ratifiers.
The nature of the constitution-making process made the people part of the drafting itself. The public debate about the content of the Constitution proceeded
and continued during the sessions of the Constitutional Convention. It is worth
noting that, from the get-go, the issue of socioeconomic rights and policy, particularly labor matters, were high up on the agenda.3 8
The governing P.D.P., an offspring of the progressive wing of the independence movement and linked with labor unions and the interests of landworkers at
the time, won by a landslide in the election of the delegates to the Convention.
Each one of their candidates was elected. The P.S.P., the conservative wing of the
pro-annexation movement, came in second. The S.P., the leftist wing of the
statehood cause with historic links to labor, and the most radical of all the parties, came in third. The makeup of the Convention itself is very revealing: there
were thirty-two lawyers, thirteen farmers, nine labor leaders, six teachers, six
merchants, five manufacturers, four physicians, and three journalists, among
others.39 Only one woman was elected. All three participating parties elected
delegates from the labor movement, which guaranteed a prioritization of socioeconomic rights and labor policy. In that sense, the Constitution stands on a
very particular ideological base of a distinctly progressive nature that is wholly
relevant in the exercise of constitutional interpretation, construction, and adjudication. Puerto Rican originalism has a distinctly leftist tongue. Also, Puerto
Rico's written Constitution extends beyond the text adopted by the Convention
in 1952. As we will see, sometimes it feels like Puerto Rico has a 2,500 page Con-

stitution when taking into account the supplemental historical material. Finally,
we have mentioned the textual basis for a broad and expansive construction of
constitutional rights laid out in Article II, Section 19.
38
Id. at 24. See also JORGE M. FARINACCI FERNOS, LA CONSTITUCION OBRERA DE PUERTO RicO: EL
PARTIDO SOCIALISTA Y LA CONVENCION CONSTITUYENTE (2015).
39

FERNOS-ISERN, supra note 5, at 25.
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In summary, the Puerto Rico Constitution is: (i) an ideologically-based, substantive-laden, progressive document with; (2) clear and extensive text -which
includes a command requiring liberal interpretation-, and (3) multiple, rich,
detailed, broad and authoritative histories of intent, purpose and meaning. Let
us now turn to what the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has done with it.
B.

Sixty-plus Years ofPuertoRican Originalism

Many cases are decided on clear text alone. Others are the pure result of
original intent and purpose. Some are even the product of the substantive nature
of the Constitution. The main focus of this article are cases in which all three
elements are present. Still, for purposes of painting a complete and thorough
picture of the Puerto Rican experience, cases that deal only with one or two of
these factors will also be mentioned.40
Originalist adjudication has been the institutional default rule at the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, but it has been an autochthonous version of
originalism. Original public meaning has not hit it off in Puerto Rico. I previously stated the reasons for this, which focus mainly on the character and nature of
the constitution-making process and the central role of the Constitutional Convention as the culmination of a public, political endeavor and the consolidation
of strong social consensus as to many of the issues facing the drafters.
One of the main terms used by the Supreme Court has been the intent of the
Convention or the drafters. In turn, it seems the concept of intent being used is a
combination of purpose and design, as well as communicative and legal content.
That is, it is a very complex and intricate conception of intent. Its interaction
with text and substance is very interesting. We are left with a clear and expansive text with rich, detailed, and authoritative sources of original meaning, intent, and purpose from the perspective of the drafters (original explication); a
rights-protective and expansive view adopted by these drafters; a clear textual
command requiring broad interpretation and construction of constitutional provisions, and firmly entrenched policy choices about social and economic issues.
As we are about to see, constitutional adjudication is not a rare instance of Puerto Rican legal reality; it is a constant feature of our democratic life.
i.

The Role of Text
a.

Clear Text

One of the main characteristics of Puerto Rican constitutionalism is the
adoption of clear text that leaves very little room for vagueness. This makes the
process of constitutional adjudication that much easier, as courts need not wrestle with what a particular provision means because, basically, the text speaks for
For this article, I identified over 300 published cases decided by the Supreme Court that dealt,
40
in one way or another, with constitutional matters. Of those 300 cases, 201 were analyzed in depth.
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itself. As a result, courts are empowered, legitimized, and actually forced to arrive at very particular results, even about controversial political issues. In many
of these cases, the Court makes direct reference to the textual clarity, in an effort
to explain that its decisions are forced. In these cases there is barely any interpretation, almost no constitutional construction is necessary, and the Framers'
commands are directly put into effect.
Sometimes, though not most of the time, clear text asks and answers a legal
question.4' That is why it was easy for the Supreme Court to hold that all discriminations based on the classifications explicitly spelled out in Article II, Section 1, were subject to strict scrutiny. This includes race, sex, color, birth, social
origin or condition, and religious or political beliefs.42 Quite a list, and yet so
little judicial effort, thanks to clear and far-reaching text. The same can be said
about instances in which the applicable textual provision is not only clear in
terms of its communicative content, but in the absolute or near-absolute nature
of the legal command articulated in the text. 43 In such cases, the Supreme Court
cannot help but note that the relevant provision is "clear and strict" and "[ilts
text does not allow any distinction."44
Although the practice has been to always back up text with history, textual
clarity has played an unequivocal part in our case law.45 This role sometimes
takes a seemingly inescapable direction: "[a]lthough every constitutional and
statutory provision is subject to different interpretations .

. .

. [we are dealing]

with language that is succinct and simple -but categorical- whose meaning is
evident."4 6 But even in these cases where text was not enough to settle the legal
question, there can be little doubt that the existence of certain textual provisions
greatly redirected the interpretation process. 47

41

See PAC v. Gobernador, 87 DPR

177,

182

(1963); Pueblo v. Alvarez Trinidad, 85 DPR 593, 598

(1962).
42

Wackenhut Corp. v. Rodriguez Aponte,

1oo

DPR 518, 531

(1972).

43 Tonos FlorenzAn v. Bernazard, in DPR 546 (1981); Mun. de Guaynabo v. Tribunal Superior, 97
DPR 545, 550 (1969).
44

Aponte Burgos v. Aponte Silva, 154 DPR 117, 133

45

Pueblo v. Tribunal Superior, 75 DPR 535, 541 (1953); Nogueras v. HernAndez Col6n I,

(2001)

(translation by the author).

405, 410-11 (1990) ("[Our constitution is written] in clear and simple language .....

127

DPR

(translation by

the author)); Nogueras v. HernAndez Col6n II, 127 DPR 638, 652 (1991) ("The constitutional command
is crystal-clear . . . ." (translation by the author)); Zavala VAzquez v. Mun. de Ponce, 139 DPR 548, 555
(1995) (Negr6n Garcia, J., concurring) ("We cannot ignore the text." (translation by the author)).
46 Asoc. Fotoperiodistas v. Rivera Schatz, 18o DPR
senting) (translation by the author).

920,

977

(2011)

(Rodriguez Rodriguez, J., dis-

47 See Fournier v. GonzAlez, 8o DPR 262 (1958); P.R. Tel. Co. v. Martinez, 114 DPR 328 (1983); Toll
v. Adorno Medina, 130 DPR 352 (1992); Rodriguez Rodriguez v. ELA, 13o DPR 562, 570 (1992); Rosario
v. Toyota, 166 DPR 1 (2005) (Rebollo L6pez, J., concurring); SuArez CAceres v. Com. Estatal Elecciones, 176 DPR 31 (2009); Brau v. ELA, 190 DPR 315 (2014).
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Ascertaining Semantic Meaning: Dictionaries and Other Sources

The characteristics of the Puerto Rican constitutional experience make it
very difficult to distinguish between ascertaining original semantic meaning and
giving legal content to the text of the Constitution. This is due to the central role
the Record of the Constitution plays in constitutional adjudication. The Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico constantly bases its interpretation and construction of the
constitutional text on the information contained in the historical record. Puerto
Rican originalism mixes and blurs the lines between original semantic meaning,
original intent, original purpose, and original expected application. There is a
little bit of each, and it is why I have employed the concept of originalexplication.
The search for originalexplication, particularly from a purposive viewpoint,
is the main focus behind the Supreme Court's approach to constitutional interpretation and construction. There are simply too many instances of the Court's
use of the Framers' expressly stated purposes, goals, explanations, understandings of semantic meaning and even plausible uses and applications of the constitutional content in the future.4 8 It is almost impossible to separate the different
tools the Court uses to ascertain meaning and legal content: "[iun our search for
the meaning of the cited provision, it is proper that we research what ideas and
purposes the Framers had in mind when they drafted the provision and adopted
it."114

In that sense, the Court's normal interpretative approach is that a particular
provision's meaning is explained by the Framers.5o That is, that the debates
among the Framers are not evidence of meaning, but that they are the authoritative source of actual meaning. In those circumstances, the Court actually interprets and applies the Framers'own interpretations.The analysis to ascertain pre
cise meaning is mostly done as to the words the Framers used in the records of
the ConstitutionalConvention as if they were the constitutional text itself. The
first crack at what the meaning of the text is belongs to the Framers through the
historical record. If the record is clear, the interpretative process ends. If there is
historical record ascribing meaning, but the words the Framers used during the
workings of the Convention are not completely clear, then the Court embarks on
a process of interpretation as to those words.
It is when there is no record to rely on that the Court actually engages in independent constitutional interpretation. When doing its own interpretation of

It would be incorrect to simply catalogue this approach as original expected applications.
48
There is a difference between what we think the Framers would have done in a particular controversy,
and what they actually and unambiguouslysaid during the debates in the floor of the Constitutional
Convention. In the latter case, the Framers used examples to clarify meaning. As a result, if a particular case before the Supreme Court is related to one of those specific examples, the examples will be
neatly applied.
49

A.D. Miranda, Inc. v. Falc6n, 83 DPR73 5 , 739-40 (1961) (translation by the author).

5o

Asoc. Maestros PR v. Srio. Educaci6n, 137 DPR 528, 544 (1994).
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meaning, the Supreme Court is all over the place.5 But for now, it is worth exploring the times in which the Supreme Court did not exclusively use the historical record to determine semantic meaning, but instead employed other tools of
interpretation in order to ascertain communicative content.52
First, there have been some expressions in favor of the fixation theory; that
is, that the semantic meaning of a word is fixed from the moment of its adoption.53 The same thing can be said about the importance and authoritativeness of
the original semantic meaning of constitutional language.54 Second, original legal
content trumps original semantic meaning when a word or concept has different
semantic and legal meanings.55 The Supreme Court does not give much importance to semantic meaning of words as distinct from their legal effects.56
Probably the biggest originalist blind spot in the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico's case law is the use of modern dictionaries to ascertain the communicative
meaning of words adopted in 1952. Even self-proclaimed originalists have incurred in this originalism faux pas. We saw this problem in AAR. In those circumstances, the Court states that it is bound by the original words of the Constitution and the original design of its Framers, but automatically, and without
much thought, quotes current dictionaries. Examples abound.57 This reinforces
the proposal that Puerto Rican originalism is one of original explication, instead
of original public meaning. The Framers also warned against limiting original
analysis to semantic meaning. According to the Supreme Court, "[the Framers]
51

tez 1,

Sometimes it focuses on debates as to grammatical implications. See Nogueras v. Rexach BeniDPR 470 (1996); Ramirez de Ferrer v. Mari BrAs, 144 DPR 141 (1997).

141

Sa This tends to happen when the historical record is not helpftl or the words to be interpreted
evade clarity. See Sostre Lacot v. Echlin of P.R., Inc., 126 DPR 781, 793 (1990) (Negr6n Garcia, J., dissenting).
Ramirez v. Registrador, n6 DPR 541, 546 (1985).
54 Academia San Jorge v. JRT, no DPR 193, 234 (198o) (Trias Monge, C.J., dissenting) (the Court
split as to whether the word employer related to the right of workers to organize a labor union and
bargain collectively included a private, religious high school).
53

55 Zavala VAzquez v. Mun. de Ponce, 139 DPR 548, 565 (1995) (Corrada del Rio, J., dissenting)
("[W]e must discard mere technicalities of semantic linguistics and focus on the real purpose behind
the constitutional [provision at issue]." (translation by the author)).
56

Viajes Lesana, Inc. v. Saavedra, 115 DPR 703 (1984); Estrella v. Mun. de Luquillo, 113 DPR 617,

618 (1982).

57 See Garcia v. Aljoma, 162 DPR 572, 591 (2004) (using a 1988 and a 1991 dictionary to interpret
and differentiate "health" and "personal integrity" in Article II, Section 16's guarantee to workers to
protections as to their health and personal integrity in the workplace); Rosario v. Toyota, 166 DPR 1,
19 (2005) (Rebollo L6pez, J., concurring) (using a 2001 dictionary to ascertain the meaning of "social"
and "condition" in Article 11, Section i's prohibition on discrimination on account of social condition); Pueblo v. Guerrido L6pez, 179 DPR 950, 957 n.5 (2010) (using a 2oo dictionary to ascertain the
meaning of "confront" in the Bill of Right's confrontation clause); In re Aprob. Rs. y Com. Esp. Ind.,
184 DPR 575, 584 (2012) (using a 2012 Royal Spanish Academy entry as to the meaning of superintend
ac used by the Framers in an internal Report to the Convention with relation to the division of powore
between the Court and the Chief Justice as to rulemaking authority inside the Judicial Branch. This is
another example of interpretation, not as to the words of the Constitution, but as to the words of the
constitutional Record).
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signaled their preference for an interpretation of language within its own social
and historiccontext over an interpretation based on dictionaries, when the language is at odds with the legal sense of the concept."8
c.

Broad Language

Constitutions cannot say everything specifically. In some instances, Framers
will use general language in order to compensate the practical unfeasibility of
articulating every conceivable rule or filling out all the details. In other words,
general language substitutes clear text. In Puerto Rico, general language is not
used as a substitute for clear text but as a supplement to it. This applies to the
death penalty, cruel and unusual punishment clauses, as well as the specific prohibitions on discrimination and the more general equal protection clause.
The Puerto Rican Constitution has text that is expressly of an aspirational
nature, 59 but which should not be dismissed as merely symbolic or even useless
in the process of constitutional construction and adjudication. For example, it
has a pivotal role to play in statutory interpretation. Sometimes the aspirational
nature of language justifies restraint. 60 But then, sometimes, the Framers intercede and language that has the textual characteristics of mere aspiration become
justiciable and binding provisions because the Framers saidso. In those circumstances, the Court is able to say that "[these provisions] cannot be reduced to
mere postulation of principles," and thus use them as binding law.61
A similar thing happens to constitutional values and ideals. They resemble
policy in that they are substantive in nature, but are general enough to be associated more with aspirations and principles. Still, these values and ideals can be
very ideologically-laden. For example, the Supreme Court has read the entirety
of Article II, Section 16's catalogue of individual workers' rights as an articulated
expression of a constitutional ideal of "the high dignity of human labor" and of
the "basic rights of workers."62 The dignity clause and the express prohibition of
discrimination are also articulations of these values and ideals that have concrete
and binding legal effect. 63 Constitutional values are also present when dealing
with balancing acts in situations where rights collide. 64

58 A.D. Miranda, Inc. v. Falc6n, 83 DPR 735, 745 (1961) (emphasis added) (translation by the author) (citation omitted).
59 See, e.g., P.R. CONST. art VI, § 19. The Section conditions the right to rehabilitation on the
availability of resources.
6o

Asoc. Academias y Col. Cristianos v. ELA, 135 DPR 150, 169 (1994).

61 Paoli M6ndez v. Rodriguez, 138 DPR 449, 460 (1995) (translation by the author). This case
involved the environmental public policy provision and statutory interpretation.
62

A.D. Miranda,Inc., 83 DPR at 741 (translation by the author).

63 See Ocasio v. Diaz, 88 DPR 676, 728 (1963); Zachry International v. Tribunal Superior, 104 DPR
267, 279 (1975).
64

See P.R. Tel. Co. v. Martinez, u4 DPR 328, 346 (1983).
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Finally, we have constitutional principles or other general language provisions that, almost inherently, have different effects than clear text articulated in
specific rules. 65 As we saw, the rule-broad language combination may create a
gray area of disagreement and under-determinacy, but is premised on the existence of an irreducible core that has rule-like effects. An example of this is the
cruel and unusual punishment provision, where the analytical emphasis is on the
penumbra more than on the core, as a testament to the strength of the core and
the potential of its penumbra. 66 The core is treated as a given and the penumbra
is given a big head start. But a Court accustomed to clear and specific language
can sometimes seem bothered by general language, for it makes interpretation
that much harder.
ii.

The Framers' Role: Intent, Purpose and Original Explication
a.

Why the Framers?

Previously, I commented on the historical significance of the constitutionmaking process that culminated not with the popular referendum that ratified
the Constitution, but with the Constitutional Convention that created it. Since
1952, there has been consensus that the relevant intent is that of the Framers
because the process was based on the notion that the People constituted themselves through the Convention. That popular process also allows for the view
that the creation of the Constitution was not an improvised, informal affair, but
a careful, historic, and well thought-out event. 6 7
This view of the Convention began early-on after the adoption of the Constitution in 1952. As early as 1954, a unanimous Supreme Court wrote: "The Consti-

tution was approved by the elected representatives of the Puerto Rican People in
a Constitutional Convention. This took place after careful considerationof each
clause by its commissions and the debates in the floor of the Convention."6 ' First,
note the view that the Constitution was not approved by the People in the ratification referendum, but by the People through the delegates. This is not merely
65 As to general language provisions, the Court will still look to the historical record as part of its
process of interpretation. In many instances, this leads to interpretations that turn general language
into very specific content.
66 See Pueblo v. Ortiz Pepin, 105 DPR 547, 586 (1977) (Negr6n Garcia, J., concurring). Negr6n
Garcia stated that:
The constitutional prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments" . . . enshrines a dynamic concept whose nature overcomes the strict, historic focus that generated its adoption, in
the sense that it only prohibits barbaric and inhumane punishments like burning someone
at the stake, decapitation, corporal dismemberment, and other forms of torture that sadly
fill up the annals of history.
Id. (translation by the author).
67

This includes the agenda and priorities of the Framers, for example, as to labor rights. Dolphin
127 DPR 869, 877 (1991).

Int'l of P.R. v. Ryder Truck Lines,
68

Pueblo v. Figueroa,

7

DPR 188, 196

(1954)

(emphasis added) (translation by the author).
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based on a positive view of representative democracy, but due to the context of
the process itself, where the People were active participants in the drafting of the
Constitution. Second, note the emphasis on the work of the Convention by way
of reference to the commission process, the role of floor debates, and the fact
that the drafting work was one characterized by careful consideration of the text.
As a result, the Framers are the main objects of historical research during the
process of constitutional interpretation, construction, and adjudication. We the
People found direct expression and articulation through the delegates. 69
Still, the emphasis is on the Framers' interpretation of the text, not the views
they may have had outside of the text. In that sense, their intent is only relevant
as it is related to text: "[wIhatever the opinions of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention were as to the minimum statutory requirements for the inscription of new political parties, the Convention ordered in Section 6 that the
applicable requirements would be those established by statutory law at the time
the Constitution was adopted."o But what started out as "deference" to the views
of the Framers in relation to the text,7' became a methodology in which the
Framers' interpretation of text became authoritative and determinative.
b. The Importance of the Historical Record and Its Central Role in
Interpretation
The constitution-making process in Puerto Rico was a public, formal and
transcendental event. The Framers were aware of this from the very beginning.
The reports of the Commissions and the debates on the floor of the Convention
were not directed exclusively at the delegates. The People, the courts, and posterity were also the object of recording the Framers' deliberations. At the heart of
these deliberations is the Constitutional Convention's Record that incorporates
both the Commission's reports and the debates on the floor. The importance the
Supreme Court has given this Record since the very beginning of the constitutional era makes it the functional equivalent of an explanatory appendix to the
main constitutional text. It is institutional practice of the Supreme Court, after
citing the relevant constitutional provision, to immediately quote the corresponding Commission's Report explanation of that provision; text and Report
become one.72
69

See Rivera Figueroa v. The Fuller Brush Co., s8o DPR 894,

902-03 (2011).

PAC v. Gobernador, 87 DPR 177, 182 (1963) (emphasis added) (translation by the author); P.R.
70
Tel. Co. v. Martinez, 114 DPR 328, 350 (1983) ("It is a document that transcends the personal preferences ofits authors." (translation by the author)).
71
Garcia Passalacqua v. Tribunal Electoral, 105 DPR 49, 69 (1976) ("[I]n view of the deference we
owe to the expressions of the Constitutional Assembly. . . ." (translation by the author)).
72
1 found over twenty constitutional cases where the routine method was to quote from the text
of the relevant constitutional provision and, immediately after, quote from the corresponding Report
by the relevant Commission. This practice spans all six decades of modern Puerto Rican constitutionalism. See, e.g., Figueroa, 7 DPR at 188; ELA v. Hermandad de Empleados, 104 DPR 436, 44o
(1975); V61ez v. Mun. de Toa Baja, 109 DPR 369, 373 n.i (1980); In re Rios, U2 DPR 353 (1982); San

N~im. 1 (2016)

ORIGINALISM IN PUERTO RICO

229

The method of quoting from the Report offers many advantages. First, it exudes legitimacy. The framing generation and the constitution-making process
still have strong support in Puerto Rico's collective memory. Tying the text to
the Record puts the Court on firmer ground. Second, it makes interpretation
safer by allowing a court that announces an unpopular result to point to the
Record as evidence of its lack of options. They are merely applying the stated,
clear, and uncontested will of the Founders. Third, it makes interpretation easier, because instead of looking for elusive collective intent, diving into old dictionaries and newspapers to ascertain original meaning, explanation, and purpose or even appearing to be making it up, the richness of the Record provides
answers to many of the most difficult questions before the Court so that, once
given, it need not look any further.
The Supreme Court has consistently expressed the central role of the Record
in constitutional adjudication. Like the use of the Commissions' reports as an
inseparable appendix to the constitutional text, reference to the authoritative
nature of the Record has been constant in sixty years of adjudication. As early as
1955, the Court stated: "[t]he question presented before us makes it necessary for
us, in our analysis of the legal scope of the constitutional provision at issue, to
examine the originalrecords of its creation."73This, of course, is inherently linked
with the issue of original intent: "[i]n our search for meaning [of the constitutional provision at issue] it is proper for us to investigate which ideas and purposes the Framers had in mind when they wrote and approved [it]."74 Over the
years, the role of the official Record has only become stronger: "[i]t is improper
to give such meaning [to the provision at issue], especially when the only direct
source that exists to interpret it, the Report [of the Commission on] the Bill of
Rights, expressly limits the prohibition [at issue]."75 And the trend continues:
Given that our constitutional document is of recent adoption, the task of researching its history in orderto interpretits different provisions"is relatively easy,
since we have preserved the memories and debates of the Constitutional Assem-

Miguel Lorenzana v. ELA, 134 DPR 405, 426 (1993); Bonilla Medina v. PNP, 14o DPR 294, 299 (1996);
Diaz v. Wyndham Hotel Corp., 155 DPR 364, 380 (2001); Pueblo v. Jaramillo Figueroa, 17o DPR 932,
937 (2007) (Rivera Pdrez, J., concurring); Pueblo v. Guerrido L6pez, 179 DPR 950 (2010).
73 SAnchez v. GonzAlez, 78 DPR 849, 851 (1955) (Negr6n FernAndez, J., concurring) (emphasis
added) (translation by the author).
74 A.D. Miranda, Inc. v. Falc6n, 83 DPR 735, 739-740 (1961) (emphasis added) (translation by the
author). See also HernAndez Agosto v. Romero Barcel6, 112 DPR 407, 421 (1982) ("It is of vital importance to look at the history of the Convention as it relates to the present issue, because it brilliantly illuminates the intent and purpose [of the provision under analysis]." (translation by the
author)).
75 Srio. DACO v. Comunidad San Jos6, Inc., 130 DPR 782, 815 (1992) (Fuster Berlingeri, J., dissenting) (translation by the author). See also Rodriguez Rodriguez v. ELA, 130 DPR 562, 570 (1992).
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bly" . . . . [T]he par excellence source used for this task is the Record of the ConstitutionalConvention.76

.

Slowly but surely, the Record has transcended being a source that helps interpretation to being the main source of interpretation.
We saw earlier how, rarely, clear text was the beginning and end of constitutional analysis. Even when the text is as clear as day, the Court routinely confirms its analysis of text with recourse to other sources, particularly the Record
of the Convention. Once the Court is satisfied that the Record directly offers the
necessary interpretation, and even construction, of the applicable constitutional
text, it routinely ends the inquiry there and resolves the question. In other
words, the Record is authoritative enough to dispend with other sources of interpretation and construction, including the independent analysis of the Supreme
Court itself
When the Record is clear as to the meaning, scope, legal effect or even application of the text, that is normally enough for the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico:
"[t]he debates [in the Convention floor] leave no room for doubt;"77 "[a] quick
glimpse [of the text and the Record] convinces us that the plaintiffs are wrong.
. . The debates in the Convention illuminate the reach and purpose [of the provision at issue];"8 "the record of the Constitutional Convention is clear;"79 "[a]n
analysis of the rich record of the Constitution leaves no room for any doubt with
respect to [what] the decisive and unanimous will of the ConstitutionalConvention was."so A clear and on-point Record is decisive and typically ends the constitutional inquiry.8 ' Of course, the Court does feel it has some wiggle room when
the Record is not on-point, and instead only addresses the issue generally.sz But
when the Record does provide an answer on-point, it resolves the issue.3 It be-

76 In re Aprob. Rs. y Com. Esp. Ind., 184 DPR 575, 582 (2012) (emphasis added) (translation by the
author) (quoting Luis MuiRiz ARGOELLES ET AL., LA INVESTIGACION JURIDICA EN EL DERECHO
PUERTORRIQUENO: FUENTES PUERTORRIQUE&AS, NORTEAMERICANAS Y ESPANOLAS 32 ( 4 th ed. 2006)). See
also Brau v. ELA, 190 DPR 315, 347 (2014) ("Just like in the federal jurisdiction they can count on The
FederalistPapersto interpret the U.S. Constitution, our system relies on the Record of the Constitutional Convention in order to interpret our Supreme Law, with the advantage that ours was approved
only a few decades ago, while its federal counterpart was adopted more than two centuries ago."
(translation by the author)).
77 Petrovich v. Srio. de Hacienda, 79 DPR 250, 260-61 (1956) (emphasis added) (translation by the
author).
78

HernAndez Agosto v. Ortiz Montes, 115 DPR 564, 565-66 (1984) (translation by the author).

79

Nogueras v. Rexach Benitez I, 141 DPR 470, 472 (1966) (translation by the author).

8o PPD v. Peia Cl6s I, 140 DPR 779, 815 (1996) (Fuster Berlingeri, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (translation by the author).
81 See Pueblo v. Quiles, 83 DPR 63 (1961); Mun. de Guaynabo v. Tribunal Superior, 97 DPR 545
(1969); Misi6n Ind. P.R. v. JP, 146 DPR 64 (1998).
82

Green Giant Co. v. Tribunal Superior, 104 DPR 489 (1975).

83 PIP v. ELA, 1o9 DPR 685, 696 (1980) (Negr6n Garcia, J., concurring). This is directly related to
the issue of specific examples and applications stated by the Framers during the debate and to the
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comes such "clear evidence" of meaning that it becomes meaning, for the Court
rarely looks elsewhere as part of its task of interpreting the Constitution. 84
At the lower level of the spectrum, the Record "confirms" the interpretation
that can be derived directly from text.85 At the higher level of deference, some
have stated that when an issue has been addressed directly by the Convention in
its debates, it is inappropriate to attempt to reach a different result by way of
another constitutional provision. 86 Associate Justice Fuster Berlingeri has articulated the most intense position: "once we have explored and have found the intent of the Framers as to one particular issue, it should not be necessary to analyze separately other sources relating to the Constitution because the result
would have to be the same."8 7 The balance favors intent over text: "[w]e did not
find anything that would lead us to conclude that the interpretation we have
adopted today was not what the Framers of our Constitution ordered."88 What is
clear from the cases of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico is that the main and
authoritative source for interpretation in our constitutional system is the Record
of the Constitutional Convention. As a general rule, if it's there, it's over. If it is
not there, then normal interpretation can proceed.
c. The Intent of the Framers as the Ultimate Source of Constitutional Adjudication
The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico's constant reference to, or use of, the intent of the Constitutional Convention is too frequent to do a case by case analysis. The number of cases in which an affirmative claim about the intent of the
Framers was made by the Court or one of its members is staggering: no less than
50 of the 201 cases analyzed for this article. Sometimes the Court makes direct
use of the term intent, 89 while, in other cases, the intent of the founders was
followed but the Court employed other, closely related terms. In other cases, the
significance of defeated amendments in the Convention floor. See infra Part II.B.ii.f; Pueblo v. Santiago Feliciano, 139 DPR 3 61 (1995).
84

PSP v. Srio. de Hacienda, no DPR 313, 318 (1980); In re Colton FontAn II, 154 DPR 776, 778

(2001).

85

Vega v. Telef6nica, 156 DPR 584, 6o

(2002).

86

Defendini Collazo v. ELA, Cotto, 134 DPR 28 (1993).
87 Id. at no (Fuster Berlingeri, J., concurring) (translation by the author). This was the statement
singled-out by Professor Villaronga in his law review article criticizing this apparent radical originalist approach. See Villaronga, supra note 27.
88 SuArez CAceres v. Com. Estatal Elecciones,
thor).
89

See, e.g., Pueblo v. GuzmAn V61ez,

1oo

176

DPR 31, at 77-78

(2009)

(translation by the au-

DPR 198, 201 (1971) (translation by the author); Green

Giant Co. v. Tribunal Superior, 104 DPR 489, 543 (1975) (Trias Monge, C.J., dissenting); PIP v. ELA,
1o9 DPR 685, 691 (1980) (DAvila, J., concurring); HernAndez Agosto v. Romero Barcel6, 112 DPR 407,
421 (1982); Ramirez v. Registrador, u6 DPR 541, 545-46 (1985) ("On this issue, the intent of the Convention was clear . . . ." (translation by the author)); L6pez, Fed. Coins. Unidos v. Mun. de San Juan,
121 DPR 75, 86 (1988); De Paz Lisk v. Aponte Roque, 124 DPR 472, 484 (1989).
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Court simply did original intent analysis without direct reference to that concept.90 In most of these cases, the concept of intentvaries, but it mostly relates to
what the Framers wanted and attempted to do, their goals, purposes, and reasons for adopting a particular text, as well as the desired outcome of their work.
But the issue of intent is not limited to affirmative claims of what the intent
was. It also extends to conclusions as to what it was not: "[a] contrary holding
would require assigning the Convention the intent to;"9' "it was not the intent of
the Constitutional Convention;"2 "if the intent had been;"93 "[t]here is no trace in
the record of an intent to."94 As a result, intent becomes a powerful tool, whether
to affirmatively assign intent to the Framers or to reverse engineer intent to oppose a particular interpretation of a provision.
The process of identifying such intent also varies. It can take many forms:
from the Framers themselves expressly articulating their intent to the Court's
own analysis of the historical record in order to identify intent. In either case,
the goal is the same: to ascertain the intent of the Framers as an authoritative
element of constitutional interpretation and adjudication. Whether the intent
relates to purpose, elaboration as to semantic or legal meaning, or concrete applications of the constitutional text, the search for intent is more or less the
same and, as a general rule, plays a decisive role. Sometimes that intent manifests itself through obvious context and what it implicates:95 "[t]he Constitutional Convention ... knew that the [provision] could not be used to that immediate
end."9 6 But the Supreme Court has gone even further than that by inferring the
information and knowledge available to the Framers.97 Some things are so obvious that they went without saying.98

go Sometimes the Court or its members makes reference to the "will" or what the Convention was
"thinking" when it adopted a particular provision. See Sinchez v. GonzAlez 78 DPR 849, 854, 855
(1955) (Negr6n Fernandez, J., concurring). It also makes reference to what the Convention "had in
mind." Mun. de Guaynabo v. Tribunal Superior, 97 DPR 545, 547 (1969) (translation by the author).
91

GonzAlez v. Tribunal Superior, 75 DPR 585,

622

(1953) (translation by the author).

92
Pueblo v. Soto, 77 DPR 206, 212 (1954) (translation by the author). See also UTIER v. JRT, 99
DPR 512, 523 (1970); Rosario v. Toyota, 166 DPR 1, 43 (2005) (Rodriguez Rodriguez, J., dissenting).

93
94

Rodriguez Rivera, Alcalde v. Comisi6n, 84 DPR 68, 8o-81 (1961) (translation by the author).
PSP v. ELA, 107 DPR 590, 598 (1978) (translation by the author).

95

Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution,

2013

ILL. L. REV. 1935, 1956

(2013).

96 Gonzdlez, 75 DPR at 622 (translation by the author). See also Figueroa v. Diaz, 75 DPR 163, 168
(1953); Fournier v. GonzAlez, 8o DPR 262, 266 (1958); Herrero v. ELA, 179 DPR 277, 293 (2010).
97 Pueblo v. Alvarez Trinidad, 85 DPR 593, 598 (1962) ("We have to suppose that when our Constitutional Convention met, it was aware ..... (translation by the author)).
98 JRT v. Asoc. Servs. M6dicos Hosp., 115 DPR 360, 365 (1984) ("At no time did the debate focus on
employees of private establishments [as to their right to unionize and bargain collectively]. Within
the context of the constitutional guarantees, the rights of these workers was not a debatable proposition." (translation by the author)).
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Using the Record

Over the past sixty years, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has consistently
looked to the Convention's official Record. It is the main, and sometimes exclusive, source of authoritative meaning of the Constitution. It would almost seem
like the delegates have become permanent members of the Supreme Court, with
the justices serving as their intermediaries. Of the 201 cases analyzed for this
article, the Supreme Court cited or made reference to the Convention Record as
an authoritative source of constitutional meaning a total of 121 times.99 Quantitatively, references to the debates on the floor were the primary source of Record
usage: eighty-nine times. The reports were mentioned seventy-three times. The
Supreme Court referenced both in a single case a total of forty-two times. This
confirms that original explication is the main model of constitutional adjudication in Puerto Rico.
But what, exactly, does the Supreme Court use the Convention's Record for?
First, it can determine the content of original communicative meaning; what the
words mean. Again, I do not mean that the Record offers evidence of original
meaning, but that it is the authoritativesource of meaning. The Record explains
both what the words meant to the Framers and what they thought the text
would entail, that is, what its effects would be. What started out as evidence
became authoritative: "[t]he Reports of the Commissions and the debates on the
floor -along with text- are the main sources used in order to determine the
meaning of our Constitution's specific provisions."'- Meaning in this context
includes both semantic content of language and its scope. This is the main crux
of the original explication approach.
The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has expressed the authoritative nature of
the Framers' interpretationof the Constitution. As early as 1956, the Court stated: "[tihe Constitutional Convention interpreted [the provision in the following
way]."'- In 1971, it went a step further: "[the contrary position] would go against
the interpretationthat the Constitutional Assembly gave to Article II, Section ii,

of our Constitution that guarantees the right to trial by jury in Puerto Rico."1o2
The textual clarity that characterizes the Constitution of Puerto Rico leaves
little room for research into the semantic meaning of the words. As a result, the
Court's historical analysis of the constitutional text focuses more on purpose and
scope. Still, the search for further explanation and elaboration as to the communicative content of the text can be found in the Court's cases. The net effect is to
give the Constitutional Convention a second bite at the apple: to repeat what
they put in the Constitution, but in longer phrases and sentences that offer a
99 The remaining cases do not reference the Record for a variety of reasons: the simple nature of
the case only required neat application of precedent or settled doctrine, and so on.
ioo

Pueblo v. Figueroa, 77 DPR 188, 196 (1954) (translation by the author).

101

Estado v. Fajardo Sugar Co., 79 DPR

321,

330 (1956) (emphasis added) (translation by the au-

thor).
102

Pueblo v. GuzmAn V61ez,

1oo

DPR 198,

201 (1971)

(emphasis added) (translation by the author).
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neater picture of what they attempted to communicate, without cluttering the
constitutional text. In some cases, the Framers themselves directly offered definitions as to the adopted text. 0 3
One of the main issues in constitutional adjudication is the scope, reach, and
effect of the words of the Constitution. The ultimate goal of judicial interpretation is not to ascertain communicative meaning, but to give it effect in concrete
situations. After identifying purpose, ascertaining effect and scope is probably
the main goal behind constitutional analysis in Puerto Rico. Examples abound.o4
Meaning and effect cannot be separated.o5 Finally, as with intent, the Record can
also reject a particular view of the scope of the text.,o6
Second, the Record explains the purpose of the constitutional text. This can
happen in two instances: (i) directly, when the Record expressly states what the
purpose is,- or (2) indirectly, when the Court can identify purpose from the
Record.os Reach and meaning can also be seen as an extension of purpose.10 9 The
search for purpose is the main focus of the original explication model.
Third, the constitutional record elaborates on what a particular provision
entails. It offers longer explanation where the constitutional text is terse. 0 The
Record "clarifies","' "sheds light" and "reveals"1z issues like meaning, intent, pur-

pose, goals, reach and scope. It can also confirm the apparently plain meaning of
language.'3

103

Figueroa v. Diaz, 75 DPR 163,

166 n.2

(1953).

L04

ELA v. Hermandad de Empleados, 104 DPR 436, 440 (1975); Molina v. CRUV, 114 DPR 295, 309
(1983) (Irizarry Yunqu6, J., concurring) ("[The debates among the delegates] are very revealing as to
the nature and scope of this [provision]." (translation by the author)); Pueblo Int'l, Inc. v. Srio. de
Justicia, 122 DPR 703, 729 (1988) (Negr6n Garcia, J., concurring).
105 Sanchez v. GonzAlez, 78 DPR 849, 853 (1955).
io6 Pueblo v. Figueroa, 77 DPR 188, 190 (1954) ("The debate in the Constitutional Convention
(translation by the author)).
clearly established that [the provision] was not meant to [say that] .
ioy See, e.g., V6lez v. Mun. de Toa Baja, 109 DPR 369, 373 n.i (1980); Pueblo v. Rivera Morales, 133
DPR 4 4 4 , 447 (1993)io8 See, e.g., San Miguel Lorenzana v. ELA, 134 DPR 405, 426 (1993); Iglesias v. Sria. Dept. Corr. y
Rehab., 137 DPR 479, 493 (1994) (Naveira, J., dissenting).
A.D. Miranda, Inc. v. Falc6n, 83 DPR 735, 739-40 (1961); In re Partici6n de los Jueces, 8o DPR
784, 784 n.1 (1958); Clemente v. Depto. de la Vivienda, u4 DPR 763, 767 (1983); HernAndez Agosto v.
Ortiz Montes, 115 DPR 564, 566 (1984).
1o9

iio

See Herrero v. ELA, 179 DPR 277,

299 (2010).

Aponte Martinez v. Lugo, 1oo DPR 282,
Medina, 175 DPR 557, 568 (2009).
iii

290 (1971)

(translation by the author); Pueblo v. PagAn

112
See, e.g., J.R.T. v. Asoc. Servs. Medicos Hosp., 115 DPR 360, 364 (1984) (translation by the author); Morales Morales v. ELA, 26 DPR 92, io6 (1990).

113

Vega v. Telef6nica, 156 DPR 584, 6o

(2002).
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Broad Purpose and Intent

Puerto Rican originalism is of a progressive, rights-protective and expansive
nature. A court in sync with this constitutional model will be legitimized -at the
very least- in pursuing those progressive substantive results. It cannot be
charged with being activist, unduly interventionist, or illegitimate.
This combination of text, history and policy -all of a progressive, expansive
nature- is not a coincidence. Progressive constitution-makers, backed up by
corresponding social and political forces, created a new type of constitutionalism
that is explicitly ideological in nature. In order to achieve these results, constitution-makers must: (i) be clear and expansive in the text they adopt; (2) articulate
their progressive views and motives in clear, authoritative history, and (3) include important social and economic issues in the text and structure of the Constitution. In all of these instances, there is a structure-content split. You can have
clear text, but it can also be narrow and minimalist in nature. You can have clear
and authoritative history, but it can be conservative, reactionary or minimalist.
You can include socioeconomic rights and entrench policy choices, but these can
also be of a conservative nature.
So far, we have seen the structural features of the Puerto Rican Constitutional Record: clarity, detail, explanation, authoritative nature, and so on. But,
there is also a substantive side to this history: the intent and purposes of the
Framers were, for the most part, explicitly progressive and rights-protective. In
particular, we can clearly appreciate a strong, pro-rights view of constitutionalism. This also applies to a broad and expansive view as to the social role of the
state and its police powers. While certain aspects of the Bill of Rights mistrusts
government encroachment, the rest of the constitutional structure sees the state
as an ally in the type of society the Constitution wishes to build.
In Puerto Rico, the Record of the Constitutional Convention points to broad,
expansive intent."4 Rights get the most attention."5 As such, seemingly broad
rulings by the Supreme Court are directly supported by original purpose and
intent."6 This also applies to constitutional prohibitions related to progressive
policies.7

n4 A.D. Miranda, Inc., 83 DPR at 735 (workers' rights); Mun. de Guaynabo v. Tribunal Superior, 97
DPR 545 (1969) (labor policy).
Zachry Int'l v. Tribunal Superior, 104 DPR 267, 280-81 (1975); ELA v. Hermandad de Empleados,
115
104 DPR 436, 44o (1975) (privacy); Figueroa Ferrer v. ELA, 107 DPR 250, 258 (1978) (same); Bonilla

Medina v. PNP, 14o DPR 294, 299 (1996) (free speech); Diaz v. Wyndham Hotel Corp.,

155

DPR 364,

380 (2001) (workplace discrimination).

u16 See, e.g., Dolphin Int'l of PR v. Ryder Truck Lines, 127 DPR 869, 877 (1991) ("When drafting our
Constitution, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention gave central importance to the issue of
labor and workers' rights. Proof of that is the agenda of the Commission on the Bill of Rights." (translation by the author)).
117

Asoc. Maestros P.R. v. Srio. Educaci6n, 137 DPR 528, 544 (1994).
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Specific Examples and Defeated Proposals

While discussing the meaning, purpose and reach of each constitutional
provision, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention constantly used examples of possible effects of the text as part of their attempts to persuade their fellow delegates. Obviously, examples are scarce. Yet, they serve two purposes.
First, there have been cases where the question under analysis was directly
related to some of the examples used during the Convention. In those circumstances, the applicable example served as authority to resolve the question. Second, when the examples are not on-point, they can be used as authoritative
analogies.
Some statements by the delegates can also have authoritative effect when
they were not challenged by the other members of the Convention. That is, the
lack of objection is taken as a sign of approval."8 Also, the Supreme Court has
taken note of instances in which an objection would have been expected, in which
case it concludes that the lack of objection points to a different interpretation
that would make an objection unnecessary.
This approach is not identical to looking for original, expected applications.
These are concrete examples and conversations during the proceedings of the
Convention that shed light on what a provision was actually designed to do.
There is a difference between expected application and the Convention's ability
to actually predict one possible scenario where its text would be applied.119
In Municipio de Guaynabo v. TribunalSuperior, the Court analyzed whether
the Constitution's unqualified command that all employees working more than
eight hours a day shall receive overtime compensation applied to municipal
workers.120 Unsatisfied with the purely textualist approach, the Court turned to
the records of the Constitutional Convention and took note of the lack of debate
as to the possibility of an exception for municipal workers:

'

It is well-known that during the debates in the Constitutional Convention no
one proposed or discussed the need to exclude government or municipal workers from the protections of Section 16. This happened, even though the [previously existent statutory] exclusion was well-known to the labor union leadership
presentat the ConstitutionalConvention.12
As a result of the unconditional nature of the text and what would have been
an expected objection from the tri-partite labor delegation, the Court held that

ii8

GonzAlez v. Tribunal Superior, 75 DPR 585, 607 (1953).

SAnchez Rodriguez v. L6pez Jimenez, n6 DPR 392, 396 (1985). In the middle of the 1980s, the
Court was briefly only staffed by one Chief Justice and three Associate Justices. Whether they were a
legitimately constituted Court became an issue. The Court held that it was. In support to their apparent self-serving conclusion, the Court stated that "[t]hankfully, the Convention had the vision and
sensibility to foresee this problem." Id. (translation by the author).
119

12o
121

Mun. de Guaynabo v. Tribunal Superior, 97 DPR 545 (1969).
Id. at 549-50 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (translation by the author).
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municipal workers were not excluded from the constitutional right to overtime
pay. This is an example of lack of expected debate as indicative of what the
meaning of the provision must be.22
One of the most important cases that used the explanations of the Framers
as to their choice of words relates to their discussions on the right to strike and
the Government's power to regulate it. Sections 17 and 18 of the Bill of Rights
give workers the right to unionize, bargain collectively, and engage in strikes.
The text also states: "[n]othing herein contained shall impair the authority of the
Legislative Assembly to enact laws to deal with grave emergencies that clearly
threaten the public health or safety or essential public services."123 The original
proposal gave much more discretion to the Legislature to pass laws restricting
strikes. The delegates from the Socialist Party objected. They proposed that the
Legislature be able to regulate strikes only in circumstances of "grave" emergencies, where there were "imminent" threats to the health, safety or the "general
welfare." The labor delegates from the majority party objected to that proposal.
They suggested that the legislative power be available only in situations of
strikes that "clearly threaten" (instead of "imminently threaten") the health, safety and "essential public services" (instead of "general welfare"). The latter proposal prevailed. Which of these languages was more pro-strike or more prolegislative power to regulate strikes? A linguistic argument could be made either
way, but the Framers themselves answered these questions through specific explanation. Just before proposing their amendment, the labor delegates from the
majority party stated that the Socialist language was insufficient, that is, that it
did not protect enough the right to strike.124 Persuaded that the new language
was more labor-protective than their own original proposal, the Socialists withdrew their amendment. This is a clear example of when the delegates' specific
characterizations of the meaning of language can be used as the determining
source for interpreting a constitutional provision.
This brings us to the issue of proposals and amendments that were defeated
during the Constitutional Convention. In general, the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico has found that rejected amendments shed light on the meaning and construction of constitutional provisions.25 Sometimes, the rejected amendment is
on-point as to the specific question before the Court. If the drafters rejected that

See also PIPv. ELA, 109 DPR 685, 696 (1980) (Negr6n Garcia, J., concurring), where one of the
delegates addressed the scenario where a 5-member Court splits 2-2-1 in a constitutional case. He
stated that such a split would render the statute constitutional ("Nobody objected this example or his
conclusions." (translation by the author)).
122

123

P.R. CONsT. art. II, §§ 17-18.

124 AAA v. Uni6n Empleados AAA, 105 DPR 437, 453 (1976) (emphasis added) (translation by the
author).
See, e.g., Estado v. Fajardo Sugar Co., 79 DPR 321, 33o n.7 (1956); ELA v. Northwestern Const.,
Inc., 103 DPR 377, 381-82 (1975) (both unsuccessfully trying to limit the eminent domain power);
AAA, 105 DPR at 453; Fuster v. Bus6, 102 DPR 327, 344 (1974).
125
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proposal, it cannot be reintroduced through interpretation.,2 6 In that sense, they
have the same effect as examples, whether they are on-point or serving as analogies.
Attention should also be given to successful floor amendments. Because they
are specifically added, they must mean something, which requires giving them
independent meaning. Otherwise, they were useless amendments. For example,
the original constitutional text only protected workers against workplace risks
that threatened their health. The delegates added the concept of personal integrity to accompany health. But, there was no debate on why the addition was necessary or what it was meant to do. The Court felt forced to give it independent
meaning and effect, so it used normal tools of interpretation and construction
2 7
for that purpose.'

g. Other Historical Sources: The University and the Delegates in
their Own Words
If you find it in the Convention Record, you have greatly improved your
chances for success in a constitutional case in Puerto Rico, but that is not the
only historical source worth researching. Almost as authoritative is the University of Puerto Rico's School of Public Administration's Report to the Convention.
The same can be said about two particular texts by leading delegates: (i) Dr. Antonio Fern6s Iserns' book Original Intent in the Constitution of Puerto Rico:
Notes and Comments Submitted to the Congress of the UnitedStates, and (2) Jos6
Trias Monge's book A ConstitutionalHistory ofPuertoRico.
Prior to the first meeting of the Constitutional Convention in 1951, the U.P.R.
School of Public Administration was recruited to draft a report that would suggest a constitutional text and structure that would, in conjunction with the political parties' programs, serve as a starting point for the works of the several Convention Commissions and, later on, the Convention as a whole. Evidently, many
of the suggestions made by the report were modified or even rejected. As to
those issues, the U.P.R. Report helps to figure out what the changes entailed.
When it comes to the suggestions that were adopted by the Convention, the
Report serves as authoritative history. The Supreme Court explains: "[w]hen the
constitutional process got underway, the School of Public Administration of the
University of Puerto Rico organized a group of political science and constitutional law specialists and scholars to advise the Constitutional Convention.112

Garcia Passalacqua v. Tribunal Electoral, 105 DPR 49, 51 (1976). We also saw Justice Fuster
Berlingeri's view that if the Convention considered an issue and settled it during their debates, the
Court cannot revive the issue by way of interpretation. See Defendini Collazo v. ELA, 134 DPR 28
(1993).
A.D. Miranda, Inc. v. Falc6n, 83 DPR 735, 738 (1961) (translation by the author).
127
126
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Part of that advising role included producing very valuable reportsthat would be
used by the Convention's Commissions.129

Like with the Record of the Convention, the U.P.R. Report includes elaboration and explanation not found in the formal constitutional text. Those explanations are relevant both for the process of semantic interpretation and legal construction.3o The scholarly nature of the Report helps explain the ideological underpinnings of the constitutional structure.3 ' But, because of the interesting social composition of the Convention, there was some disparity in points of view.
For example, the U.P.R. suggested omitting references to labor rights in the constitutional text, in order to allow for further developments in conflict resolution
that would be hindered if the text was too strict as to labor rights. The Convention flat out rejected that proposal.13 This generates several results. First, it reinforces the modification, because it expresses a particular will on behalf of the
Framers that trumped the U.P.R.'s suggestions. Second, it can create an ideological disparity that requires us to: (1) be very careful when using the U.P.R. Report
as an authoritative source, and (2) take into account the ideological makeup of
the Convention when engaging in constitutional adjudication.'33 Still, when the
Report is in sync with the Convention, it can be used as an authoritative source,
even more so when its content is on-point with the question before the Court.34

That is why some Justices believe the Report is "an integral part of the history of
the Constitution."35 Most of the time, the Report is used as one tool out of many
that confirms the overall interpretation.3 6
Dr. Antonio Fern6s Isern was appointed Resident Commissioner in 1946 and
then elected to that post in 1948, which he would occupy until 1964. As Resident
Commissioner during this crucial part of Puerto Rican history, Fern6s Isern
served as a sort of permanent ambassador in Congress. Because of the congressional origin of the constitutional process, the final Constitution had to be pre129

Id.

130

Mari BrAs v. Caseiias, 96 DPR 15, 19 (1965).
Aponte Martinez v. Lugo, oo DPR 282, 291
state" in formation.
131

132

(1971).

The Report makes reference to the "liberal

AAA v. Uni6n Empleados AAA, 105 DPR 437, 443 (1976).

133 Sometimes the ideological views coincided, as with the issue of socio-economic rights. See
Rodriguez v. Srio. de Instrucci6n, 1o9 DPR 251, 263 (1979); Garcia v. Aljoma, 162 DPR 572, 580-81
(2004).

134 Fuster v. Bus6, 102 DPR 327, 348 (1974) ("The New Constitutionof PuertoRico, a very valuable
volume that includes the Reports to the Constitutional Convention prepared by the School of Public
Administration of the Social Sciences College of the University of Puerto Rico, published in 1954,
includes commentary about [the question before the Court] in such a manner that they would seem
to have been written because of the case at bar." (emphasis added) (translation by the author)). See
also Pueblo v. Ramos Santos, 138 DPR 81o, 829 (1995) (Fuster Berlingeri, J., concurring).
135

PPD v. Pefia Cl6s 1, 140 DPR 779, 813 (1996) (Fuster Berlingeri, J., concurring in part and dis-

senting in part) (translation by the author).
136
See, e.g., Nogueras v. Rexach Benitez 1, 141 DPR at 492 (HernAndez Denton, J., concurring);
Ramirez, 144 DPR at 175; C6rdova v. CAmara Representantes, 171 DPR 789, 804 n-7 (2007).
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sented to Congress for its approval. Because of his status as Resident Commissioner and as one of the principal members of the P.D.P. leadership, Fern6s Isern
was chosen as President of the Constitutional Convention. Yet, one of his most
critical roles would be played after the Convention finished its work: selling the
Constitution to Congress.
Hence his Original Intent in the Constitution of Puerto Rico: Notes and
Comments Submitted to the Congress of the United States. Although not an official report, as President of the Convention and Resident Commissioner in Congress, Fern6s Isern's views on the Constitution were highly authoritative. Still,
some caution should be had when reading Fern6s Isern's book. Precisely because
he had to sell the Constitution to a conservative Congress at the height of the
Cold War, several of the more progressive and socially-oriented provisions of the
Constitution were downplayed. The same thing happened to provisions that
were based on foreign sources. This can create confusion as to the apparent limited scope of these provisions. It was not until 2004 that it was first quoted by
the Supreme Court.13
Jos6 Trias Monge served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
from 1974 until 1985. Before that, he served as Attorney General. At only 31, he

was elected as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, where he would distinguish himself greatly. He is considered one of the main architects of the Constitution. One can only imagine the process where, as Chief Justice, he had to
interpret and apply constitutional provisions he helped create as a delegate,
without making direct statements to his former role. As such, his role alone as
former delegate turned Chief Justice makes for a very interesting discussion.
Trias Monge published a scholarly book called A ConstitutionalHistory of
Puerto Rico in 1980, that is, while serving as Chief Justice. Probably because of
the awkwardness of quoting the then-Chief Justice's book about the Constitution, it was not used by the Supreme Court until 1996, shortly after the latest
edition came out.13 Curiously, the main use of this book is more historic than

legal: to explain the inner workings of the Convention and the compromises
made during its proceedings.139 In other words, it helps to piece together how the
text was adopted and how the different sources, like the U.P.R. proposals and the
positions of the several political parties, interacted.14o Thus, it is a rich, non-legal
137 See, e.g., Garcia, 162 DPR at 587; Pueblo v. Candelario, 166 DPR n8, 140 (2005); In re Disposiciones C6d. Electoral, 184 DPR 369, 376 (2012) (Rodriguez Rodriguez, J., dissenting).
138

JRT v. Corp. del Conserv. M6sica P.R., 14o DPR 407, 429 (1996).

139 Id. According to the book, Article II, Section 17's recognition of the right to unionize in private
companies and public corporations:
[W]as the result of an agreement made during the constitutional drafting process, between
those who wanted to give those rights to every worker in Puerto Rico, whether in the private or government sector, and those who wanted to deny such rights to public employees,
even those of public corporations that operated as private business.

Id. (translation by the author); see also Misi6n Ind. P.R. v. JCA, 145 DPR 908, 919 (1998).
14o

See Herrero v. ELA, 179 DPR

277, 292 (2010).
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source for ascertaining intent, just like Madison's notes are to the federal Constitution.'4' Yet, Trias Monge's book is quoted just as often as the U.P.R. Report, and
just as authoritative,142 and the Court has made efforts to harmonize his descriptions with the constitutional text.143 Of course, all of these secondary sources pale
in comparison with the use of the official Convention Record.III. PURPOSE, INTENT AND TEXT: A DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP

A.

Iron in the Glove: When Purpose, Intent and Text Combine

Normally, there is a neat correlation between what was intended and what is
enacted through text. As we have seen, even in cases where the text is clear and
unambiguous, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico looks for confirmation in the
Record of the Constitutional Convention. Most of the time, the conclusion is
unsurprising: the Record confirms the reading of the text. The instances in
which the Record fits in hand in glove with the apparent meaning of the text are
just too many to mention individually: I have counted at least thirty-four cases
where this phenomenon can be identified by plain sight. The lesson is simply
enough: when this combination exists, the case is basically over. Examples
abound.45
B.

Purposeversus Text: When the Why (Mostly) Trumps the What

The Constitutional Convention adopted text that could have wide effect.
Sometimes, this type of text was chosen for a particular reason that might be
narrower than what the text could encompass from a semantic standpoint. In
other words, the Framers might have adopted text that exceeded their designs.
What should the Supreme Court do in these circumstances? The empirical answer to what the Court has actually done is complex. First, it has taken different

141
See Empresas Loyola v. Com. Ciudadanos, 186 DPR 1033, 1043 (2012) (explaining that the Convention was very aware that the environmental policy provision was not aspirational but operative).
See also Alvarado Pacheco v. ELA, 188 DPR 594, 614 (2013).

14

See Freire Ayala v. Vista Rent, 169 DPR 418, 433 (2oo6).

143

PPD v. Pefia Cl6s 1, 14o DPR 779, 8oi (1996) (Naveira, J., concurring).

144 Another important historical source related to original explication were the actions of the First
Legislature after the Constitution was adopted. Most of its members had been delegates to the Convention. The Court considers their actions both as an extension of original explication and as almost
inherently constitutional. See In re Gallardo, 81 DPR 19, 50 (1958) (Opinion of Hern~ndez Matos, J.);
GonzAlez v. Tribunal Superior, 75 DPR 585, 626-27 (1953).

145

Pueblo v. Tribunal Superior, 75 DPR 535, 548 (1953); Mun. de Guaynabo v. Tribunal Superior,
97 DPR 545, 550 (1969); Zachry Int'l v. Tribunal Superior, 104 DPR 267, 282 (1975); In re Rios, 112 DPR
353 (1982); HernAndez Agosto v. Ortiz Montes, n5 DPR 564, 566 (1984); Dolphin Int'l of P.R. v. Ryder
Truck Lines, 127 DPR 869, 878 (1991); Asoc. Maestros P.R. v. Srio. Educaci6n, 137 DPR 528, 545-46
(1994); McClintock v. Rivera Schatz, 171 DPR 584, 597 (2007); Asoc. Fotoperiodistas v. Rivera Schatz,
i8o DPR 920, 977 (20) (Rodriguez Rodriguez, J., dissenting).
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roads with no discernable criteria as to why it would hold one way in one case
and another later on. Second, it mostly has split in favor ofpurpose over text. This
last fact reinforces the notion that Puerto Rican originalism gives more weight to
the framer's intent than to the public meaning of the adopted words. Finally,
there are also instances with the opposite effect: text appears to not allow a particularly expansive construction but then the purpose and intent behind it allows
it.

The purpose-over-text method reveals an originalist mindset. At the same
time, because the Framers' intent and purpose is mostly expansive and progressive, the familiar originalists-as-conservatives idea dissipates quickly. Add to this
a rights-protective text that articulates and entrenches social-oriented policy
choices, and Puerto Rican originalism takes the classic notions of originalism in
a whole new direction which can be very relevant to other constitutional systems.
Purpose-and-intent-over-text's main manifestation is using the former to
qualify and limit the latter. Its effect has not been a negation of the text in the
name of intent. It has merely contained text that, without being linked with very
particular purposes, could have allowed for additionalresults. Expansive does
not equal progressive. Purpose-based containment of text can yield progressive
results when the potential expansion, outside the realm of the original intent,
can actually create conservative results, contrary to the wishes of the Framers.
But mostly, the concern of the Court which has led it to apply a purpose-over-text
method does not come from an interestin yielding progressiveresults, but in order
to be able to claim to have acted legitimately. It was the Framers who were pro6
gressives, not the justices.14
In Toll v. Adorno Medina, the Court faced the question of whether the Constitution's seemingly absolute exclusionary rule as to evidence obtained illegally
applied to civil controversies in which the state was not a party.147 The text states
that "[e]vidence obtained in violation of this section shall not be admissible in
court."148 Both the majority and the dissent agreed that the text, on its face, appeared to be an "absolute prohibition."49 Yet, the majority dove into the Convention's Record to ascertain the purpose and intent behind this provision and
found that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to dissuade improper state
action, which was not present in a civil case where the state was not a party.
Therefore, it held that the exclusionary rule did not apply in these situations.
One dissenter struck back in textualist terms. According to Associate Justice
Rebollo L6pez -mostly a text-over-purpose believer-, by allowing the illegal evidence to be used in this case, "a majority of the members of this Court rewrite, at
146 See P.R. Tel. Co. v. Martinez, 114 DPR 328, 325 (1983) (limiting the absolute ban on phonetapping to its purpose of protecting private consensual conversations); De Paz Lisk v. Aponte Roque,
124 DPR 4 7 2, 484 (1989) (Article II, Section i's list of prohibited discriminations is not exhaustive).

147

Toll v. Adorno Medina, 130 DPR 35 2

148

P.R. CONST. art. II, §

149

Toll,

13o

1o.

DPR at 359-60.

(1992).
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their leisure, Article II, Section io, of our Constitution, sacrificing the rights that
the Constitutional Convention expressly wanted to guarantee to the citizens of
this Country by adopting the quoted provision."150 In his view, while the purpose
behind the text protects its minimum use -criminal cases or cases where the
state is a party-, the text does not limit itself to those situations. Justice Rebollo
L6pez clearly stated that his view was not expansive for expansion's sake, but
"simply, we are confrontedwith express and specific languagein our Constitution,
which we are bound to obey and put into practice."15 In final analysis, "the command ... could not be any clearer;" illegally obtained evidence simply could not
be introduced in Puerto Rican courts.s2
For his part, Associate Justice Fuster Berlingeri -the Court's iconic progressive, living originalist who favored intent over text- also dissented. But his dissent was premised on an originalpurpose model. For him, the original purpose
behind the text was not limited to the one mentioned in the majority opinion,
which covered the controversy before the Court.'53
The purpose-versus-text clash would rise again. In Diaz Aponte v. Comunidad San Josd, two private actors engaged in an economic transaction. One of the
parties failed to pay what he owed to the other party.1 54 The creditor filed a collection action with the consumer protection agency, which ordered his debtor to
pay what he owed. The debtor ignored the order. Eventually, he was found in
civil contempt and incarcerated until he obeyed the order, that is, until he paid
his creditor. The problem was that the Constitution has the following provision:
"[n]o one shall be incarcerated because of debt."5 No qualifications, no conditions, no limitations. For the majority, by way of Justice Rebollo L6pez, this was
an open and shut case: the text was simply overwhelming. Because the debtor
had been sent to jail, in the end, for failure to pay a private debt, there was a
constitutional violation.
But the dissent felt the majority failed to do what it normally did: look to the
Record of the Convention and find out why the Framers adopted that text. According to Justice Fuster Berlingeri, the Framers were concerned with poor people "who couldn't pay their debts" and, as a result, were sent to jail; unlike the
defendant in the present case who, "although he could pay, simply chose not
to."5 6 He then blasted the Court, not just for its textualism, but for its disregard
to the original intent of the Framers:

150

Id. at 364 (Rebollo L6pez, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

x5i

Id. at 368.

152

Id. at 369.

L53

Id. at 373 (Fuster Berlingeri, J., dissenting).

154 Srio. DACO v. Comunidad San Jose, Inc., 130 DPR 782, 815
ing).

(1992)

§ i.

155

P.R. CONST. art. II,

156

Srio. DACO, 130 DPR at 814 (Fuster Berlingeri, J., dissenting).

(Fuster Berlingeri, J., dissent-
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We cannot give such a misplaced effect to an alleged command of our Constitution, especially when the only direct source that exists to interpret the constitutional provision in question, the Report on the Bill of Rights, expressly limits the
prohibition on incarcerationbecause of debt to persons who do not have the resourcesto pay.'57
This is one of the few clear-cut cases where purpose was ignored in favor of a
textualist reading.15 It is also one of the few cases where adopting a broad and
generous interpretation of a right did not necessarily coincide with the purposive, and especially progressive, approach. Of course, there are also cases that
transcend the original purpose by taking expansive text in a progressive direc-

tion.'59
The lessons that can be derived from the purpose-containing-text model are:
(1) text does not operate alone, it requires context in order to adequately identify
its appropriate legal effects; (2) purpose is the main tool that can achieve this; (3)
purpose is defined as the original intent and design of the Framers and the goals
they wished to achieve; (4) original purpose is, most of the time, of a broad and
expansive nature; (5) purpose may result in narrower applications of text than
what the language could include, but that narrower use may still be quite expansive, broad and progressive when compared to other constitutional structures,
and (6) finally, the Supreme Court adopts this model because of the authoritative nature of the Convention Record. But probably one of the most interesting
results from the purpose-versus-text experience has been that, in most cases,
either one will yield some sort of progressive result in the end. Both can take you
to similar places, as we saw with the dissents in Toll v. Adorno Medina.
C.

When the Record is Silent: What is the Court to do?

We already saw what happens when the text is silent as to the crucial question before the Court. In most cases, the Supreme Court will look to general language or implicit answers that derive from the text. It can also fall back on the
Record. Because of the substantial differences in length between the constitutional text and the 2,500 page Record, we can think of scenarios where the text is
silent but the Record is not. But, even 2,500 pages have limits; the Framers could
not state everything they thought, much less see into the future. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court finds itself on strange ground: having to address
the constitutional question without any guidance from the Framers. What the
U.S. Supreme Court does every day, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court sees as an
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Id. at 815 (emphasis added).

See PAC v. Gobernador, 87 DPR 177, 182 (1963).
159 Mercado Vega v. UPR, 128 DPR 273, 284 (1991) (equal pay for equal work provision not only
applies to gender inequalities, but to any "pay gap that is devoid of justification." (translation by the
author)).
158
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anomaly. And because there is no progressive intent to rely on, the Court's own
interpretations can go either way.
One of the most interesting aspects of these types of situations is that the
Court will volunteer in its opinion the fact that there is no Record on which to fall
back. The Court, in order to protect its legitimacy, feels obligated to justify the
use of its independent power of interpretation by referencing the lack of direct
commands from the Framers.'6 And when a direct command is missing,'6' the
Court will still look to general statements made by the Framers. 62 Even isolated
statements made during the proceedings of the Convention will be used. 63 That
is, the Court's use of the Record resembles classic approaches to text: first look
for the specific and, if absent, look for the general. Finally, sometimes historical
silence, like textual silence, means that whatever we are looking for probably is
not there to begin with. 6 4 In the end, a rule emerges: only when the Record is

totally silent will the Court take it upon itself to offer its own interpretation of
the Constitution.1 65
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL

SELF-GOVERNANCE:

ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND PROGRESSIVE

ENTRENCHED

SOCIO-

POLICY CHOICES

A. The Effects of Textual Entrenchment
The emergence of constitutional supremacy, and the idea of legal provisions
that become higher law outside the reach of ordinary legislation, opened a new
era of constitution-making: what should be entrenched in the Constitution?
Slowly but surely, modern constitutionalism moved in a direction of entrenching
more and more rights, and of a new nature: socio-economic, positive and collective. Eventually, substantive policy choices of issues related to economic structure, environmental conservation, labor organization, and so on, would also be
entrenched. Because of the nature of these rights and the rationale behind them
-mistrust of ordinary politics susceptible to hijacking by powerful economic
forces-, the new entrenched content of modern constitutions is, generally, of a
progressive nature.
There are two main effects of entrenchment. First, that a right or policy is
shielded from modification by ordinary legislation. It is simply out of reach. But
the content and effect of that right or policy are the same as if they were statutes;

16o The Court would also seem to suggest that parties should find support for their arguments in
the Record. SAnchez Rodriguez v. L6pez Jim6nez, n16 DPR 392, 394 (1985).

161 See
51 (1973).

Rullin v. Sec. Hacienda, 78 DPR 521, 531 (1955); GonzAlez v. Alcalde de Utuado, ioi DPR 47,

162

Arroyo v. Rattan Specialties, Inc., 117 DPR 35, 58-59 (1986).

163

Rodriguez Rivera, Alcalde v. Comisi6n, 84 DPR 68, 8o (1961) ("[S]carce references").

164

Autoridad de Comunicaciones v. Tribl. Superior, 87 DPR 1, 11

165

Garcia v. Aljoma, 162 DPR 572, 589

(2004).

(1962).
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just that they are now entrenched statutes. Second, that because something received constitutional status, it must mean that, on top of formal entrenchment,
the adopted text has a different effect than if it had been adopted as a statute.
Both manifestations of the entrenchment effect are present in Puerto Rican constitutional adjudication. The history of the provision shows if the Framers preferred one of these effects. The cases of the Supreme Court signal a preference
for the second view, that is, that obtaining constitutional rank means the particular issue has gained substantive weight on top of formal entrenchment.'6 This
means that only if the record clearly shows that constitutional entrenchment
was done merely as a formal device to avoid potential modifications in the future, the Court will assume constitutional status means stronger substantive
weight.
B.

The Notion of Constitutionally-RankedPublic Policy

From a purely textual standpoint, it seems difficult to distinguish a cluster of
rights and directives -or even a single right or rule- from a coherent public policy as to particular issues. Yet, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has acknowledged the existence of constitutionally-ranked public policies.67 The interesting
thing is that these are, precisely, the result of individualrights (individual as in
rights independent of each other) and specific rules, plus the combinations they
create.
In some cases, the Framers themselves state that the combination of rights
and rules they are adopting constitutes an entrenchment of public policy. 68 In
other situations, it is the Supreme Court itself that concludes, through its own
analysis of the provisions and their history, that a constitutionally-rankedpublic
policy exists.'69 It is an instance of the Court recognizing that what the Convention did was not just adopt separate, independent provisions related to rights
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For cases that limit constitutional status as merely formal entrenchment, see GonzAlez v. Tribunal Superior, 75 DPR 585, 6o6 (1953); Fournier v. GonzAlez, 80 DPR 262, 265 (1958); Rodriguez
Rodriguez v. ELA, 130 DPR 562, 573 (1992). Most cases give an additional effect to entrenchment, and
these are generally to labor and other socio-economic rights. See A. D. Miranda, Inc. v. Falc6n, 83
DPR 735, 740 (1961); Figueroa Ferrer v. ELA, 107 DPR 250, 258 (1978); JRT v. Asoc. Servs. M6dicos
Hosp., n5 DPR 360, 364 (1984) ("constitutional roots" of collective labor rights); Misi6n Ind. P.R. v.
J.C.A., 145 DPR 908, 918 (1998); AMPR v. Srio. Educaci6n, ELA, 178 DPR 253, 271 (2010) (education);
COPR v. SPU, 181 DPR 299, 317 (201); Whittenburg v. Col. Ntra. Sra. del Carmen, 182 DPR 937, 949,
966 (2011).
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DPR 1,

SIU de PR v. Otis Elevator Co., 1o5 DPR 832, 843 (1976); Santini Rivera v. Serv. Air, Inc., 137
12 (1994).
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Paoli M6ndez v. Rodriguez, 138 DPR 449, 460 (1995). Actually the text of the Constitution itself
states the existence of the public policy, in this case, as to environmental conservation. See also Rivera
Sierra v. Supte. Anexo 500 Guayama, 179 DPR 98, 101-02 (2010), for the textual provision relating to
the rehabilitation of persons convicted of crimes.
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Pueblo v. Soto,

77 DPR 206, 212

(1954); P.R. Tel. Co. v. Martinez, 114 DPR 328, 343 (1983).
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and substantive rules, but a coherent whole that reveals policy choices.o70 This
can be the product of analyzing provisions plus their history, or it can be deduced from an integrated reading of several provisions independent of their history.'?7
Constitutional public policies have three types of effects: (1) they influence
the way courts adjudicate concrete cases that deal with issues related with those
policies;z72 (2) they generate a constitutionally-sensitive process of statutory construction,17 and (3) they can combine with those statutes to create even stronger
policy commands and directives.174
C. The Ideological Underpinningsand Social Context of the Constitution
Modern constitutions do not tend to be neutral and have recently become
the focus of triumphant social, political, cultural and economic forces. Whether
a new nation declaring its independence, a democratic transition from an authoritarian regime or a socialist revolution empowering previously oppressed
classes, the resulting constitution becomes the culmination and crystallization of
that process, and the beginning of a new one under its reign. As a result, modern
constitutions can be very polarizing. One of the main goals of these types of constitutions is to establish itself as the constitution of the land, and not only of the
victorious forces; to create a new hegemony with the constitution as the uniting
center. The creation and sustainment of a social consensus is therefore key: creating the consensus that will allow the constitution to have a strong beginning
and then sustaining that consensus to allow the constitution to grow roots and
become part of the social identity of the community.
Puerto Rico's Constitution is of a mixed sort. On the one hand, it is despised
as a colonialist tool. On the other hand, Puerto Rico has functioned under the
current Constitution uninterruptedly since 1952. Furthermore, the progressive,
expansive and protective nature of the Bill of Rights has allowed the Constitution
to sustain its legitimacy for over sixty years. All attempts to change the Constitution towards a regressive direction have failed. The People have protected their
Bill of Rights.
Finally, constitutions are also not divorced from their social context. What
was going on when it was written? This is fundamental to an originalist approach: the why behind the why. When analyzing the purposes, intent and ex-
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Asoc. Maestros P.R. v. Srio. Educaci6n, 137 DPR 528, 541(1994).
Rivera Figueroa v. The Fuller Brush Co., 18o DPR 894, 902 (2011).

172

See, e.g., Pooli Mndez, 138 DPR at 460.

17o

See, e.g., Autoridad de Comunicaciones v. Tribl. Superior, 87 DPR 1, u (1962); Marrero v. Mun.
de Morovis, 115 DPR 643 (1984); Garcia PagAn v. Shiley Caribbean, Etc., 122 DPR 193 (1988); UPR v.
Asoc. Pur. Profs. Universitarios, 136 DPR 335 (1994); Rivera Figueroa,18o DPR at 903.
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174
See, e.g., JRT v. Asoc. Servs. M6dicos Hosp., n5 DPR 360, 365 (1984); Rivera Sierra v. Supte.
Anexo 500 Guayama, 179 DPR 98, 101-02 (2010); Whittenburg v. Col. Ntra. Sra. del Carmen, 182 DPR

937, 949-66 (2011).
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planations of the Framers, one must also keep in mind the social forces that were
influencing the drafting process. The Constitution of Puerto Rico is a child of
1951-1952, and the social struggles and battles that preceded it.175
Puerto Rico's Constitution has had a central role in social life. While Puerto
Ricans may not know every detail in the text, they share a notion that we have
our own Constitution and that it is more progressive and rights-protective than
its federal counterpart. Consequently, affirmations of loyalty to the Constitution
and its text soak any argument in political legitimacy. The case for some sort of
originalism grows stronger.
But, what are the ideological underpinnings of the Constitution of Puerto
Rico? How has the Supreme Court characterized and used those ideological
foundations and the social context behind the creation of the Constitution? The
ideological battle for the soul of the Constitution is not a settled matter and it is
an issue that is constantly debated.
"On the 2 5 th ofJuly, 1952, life was given in America to the most beautiful and
human of statements concerning social justice that a People's democratic conscience can aspire to: equality of birth before the law."7 6 This statement from
1953 is a celebration of the new Constitution. From the very beginning, the Supreme Court was aware of the social ideology that created the Constitution:
The People of Puerto Rico have constantly demonstrated, both ideologically as
well as in practice, that they have faith in the fundamental values of the liberal
tradition, in freedom and the dignity of the individual as the ultimate point of
reference in terms of values for social organization. They have strengthened the
ideals and the practice of democracy in its economic, politicaland social aspects.

We have to acknowledge their admirable effort to contribute to the vindication
of democratic as to its own capacity to deal with the problems caused by the
failures of the capitalistsystem. The quality and respectability of these triumphs

require constitutional provisions of the greatest category, which are included in
the Preamble, the Bill of Rights and in every cornerof ourSupreme Law. This will

be the first democratic Constitution we have after four and a half centuries of
our existence as an organized community, and such opportunity cannot be
squandered.-n

Whether harmoniously or in tension, the liberal democratic and social democratic tendencies of the Constitution are a constant presence in Supreme Court
practice in Puerto Rico. I suggest that, in 1952, social democracy was seen as the
natural development of liberal democratic thought, having Puerto Rico's Consti-
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Ramirez de Ferrer v. Mari Brbs,

144

DPR 141, 221 (1997) (Negr6n Garcia, J., concurring) ("Every

Constitution brings with it historical and legal-political meaning that reflects the vicissitudes of the
process of its creation, the content and tenor of its norms, values and institutions." (translation by
the author)).
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Figueroa v. Diaz, 75 DPR 163, 166 (1953).
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A.D. Miranda, Inc. v. Falc6n, 83 DPR 735, 739 (1961) (emphasis added) (quoting EscUELA DE

ADMINISTRACION POBLICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO Rico, LA NUEVA CONSTITUCION DE PUERTO
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tution "one of the most liberal, generous and authentically democratic Bill of
Rights in the world."78 Whether that was a plausible ideological proposal is another matter and it has allowed the Court to navigate through both waters from
time to time; as to political rights, the Constitution of Puerto Rico incorporates
the most advanced concepts and principles of liberal democratic thought,79
while, as to the new wave of socio-economic rights, its approach is of a different
nature.8 o The main thrust behind the latter are provisions that deal with labor
matters and the express ideological explanations offered by the Framers.s' The
Court has not shied away from acknowledging the Constitution's overt social
purposes or ideological connotations.82 I believe the dual nature of the Constitution can also be attributed to the liberal-democratic model used by the U.P.R.
School of Administration when drafting its proposals, and the more socialistic
tendencies of many of the Framers. 83
The question that remains is what to make of the Constitution as a whole.
According to the Supreme Court, our Constitution is a high intensity liberal
democratic document that incorporated social-democratic principles and serves
as a link between these two models. I believe this is where the Court's originalism fails to make an appearance: it has been the Court, on itself and building on
classic notions about the judicial role and constitutionalism, that has somewhat
redefined the ideological character, if not the content, of the Constitution. Yet,
because of the force of its text and history, the Constitution strikes back and its
ideological nature finds a way into the Court's opinions. But, what has served as
an ideological common ground, originalism included, is the Constitution's unequivocal commitment to human dignity as the defining constitutional value,,84
which can be claimed both by high intensity liberal democratic and socialist perspectives.
Puerto Rico's Constitution is hardly neutral; its history is overtly ideological.
While not revolutionary in any sense of the word, its social nature cannot be
ignored. That is why most, if not all, of the entrenched public policy choices are
178

Pueblo v. Santiago Feliciano, 139 DPR 361, 436 (Rebollo L6pez, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

179 See ELA v. Rivera Rivera, 105 DPR 64o, 641-42 (1977) (Negr6n Garcia, J., dissenting); Pierson
Muller II v. Feijo6, so8 DPR 261, 270-71 (1978).
s8o Molina v. CRUV, 114 DPR 295, 308 (1983) ("In Puerto Rico, we forged a Bill of Rights, not in the
18th Century, like in the United States, but in the thrust of the Twentieth Century inspired by the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights." (translation by the author)).
181

See, e.g., Mercado Vega v. UPR, 128 DPR 273, 284 (1991).
182 Mun. de Guaynabo v. Tribunal Superior, 97 DPR 549 (1969); Rivera Figueroa v. The Fuller
Brush Co., 18o DPR 894, 902 (2011).
183

See Garcia v. Aljoma, 162 DPR 572, 580-81 (2004); FARINACCI FERNOS, supra note 38.

184 According to the chairman of the Constitutional Convention's Commission on the Bill of
Rights, the concept of human dignity is the central, constant and core element of the entire constitutional structure. In that sense, human dignity serves as an omnipresent value that permeates all
constitutional analysis. Andino Torres, ex parte, 151 DPR 794, 807 (2000) (Negr6n Garcia, J., concurring).
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of a progressive nature that give away its ideological tendencies and, one would
hope, should force courts to recognize it and abide it. I dare characterize Puerto
Rico's Constitution as within the post-liberal family.
D. ConstitutionalPublic Policy in Practice
i. Labor
It is no coincidence that labor issues are front and center in the realm of
constitutionally-ranked public policies in Puerto Rico. As we saw in Part 11(a),
after lawyers -some of whom were known labor attorneys-, the most represented
occupations in the Convention were farmers, labor leaders and teachers. These
delegates came from all three parties. Moreover, both the P.D.P. and, especially,
the S.P., made their labor proposals the centerpiece of their electoral campaign
for the selection of delegates. The Socialists even wanted to introduce a Labor
Bill of Rights that would be separate from the general Bill of Rights.
The end result was a Bill of Rights that is labor-focused. As the Supreme
Court has observed, more than a quarterof all Article II (Bill of Rights) sections
deal with labor issues.18 The main textual provisions are Sections 16, 17 and 18.
Section 16 deals with individual rights, while the other two sections deal with
collective rights. One could say that these sections merely articulate a catalogue
of rights that have no collective weight that is different from the sum of its parts.
But even then, it is quite a list and the rights these sections enumerate are all
justiciable: right to freely choose one's work and to resign from it, an eight-hour
work day and minimum overtime pay of a time-and-a-half, equal pay for equal
work, a reasonable minimum wage, protection against hazardous working conditions, right to unionize, bargain collectively and strike, and so on."
But the Constitution's approach to issues related to workers and labor conditions is not limited to a set of separate rights. There is a discernible constitutional public policy that transcends them. This conclusion is not just an evaluation of
the textual structure of the Constitution, but, of course, of the history of the
framing. This has resulted in a host of constitutional cases dealing with labor
issues, even if the Constitution is only used as background or as a prism for statutory interpretation. When it comes to labor cases, it is virtually impossible to
ignore the Constitution. Of the 201 cases used for this article, no less than 44
deal, whether directly or indirectly, with labor issues. Constitutional labor cases
have been a constant for more than sixty years.
These cases come in all sizes and shapes. Originalism can only take us so far.
At the end of the day, we need willing courts. There is no guarantee that courts
will obey the commands of the text, the intent of the Framers or the purposes
Rivera Figueroa v. The Fuller Brush Co., 18o DPR 894, 902 (2011).
186 The Socialists even proposed that the Constitution require that a minimum percentage of the
profits of certain sized private establishments be shared with the workers. FARINACCI FERNOS, supra
note 38.
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behind both. If the goal is to force courts to arrive at a particular result, judges
can still go rouge. An originalist approach can only help to minimize these risks.
But, an argument can be made in these circumstances that would be totally absent in older constitutional settings: that the court has acted illegitimately or
contrary to the constitutional design.
This is crucial in marginal cases in Puerto Rico that do not directly threaten
the existence of the right to strike, but its effectiveness. Two things are key here.
First, a court that goes for the expansive, progressive reading would be, at least,
legitimized by the constitutional text and history. A broad ruling would not be
vulnerable to attack. Second, if the court does not engage in expansive construction, and limits itself to the minimum requirements of the Constitution -for
example, that the right to strike exists- it can be accused of having acted illegitimately. In this scenario, the decision could be seen as an underuse, or even blatant disregard, of the Constitution. The point is that while a court with an ideological Constitution can always escape the desired result, that minimalist approach is vulnerable to charges of constitutional illegitimacy. At the same time, a
court that decides to go full force can always count on the text and history of the
Constitution to back its decision. As a result, probably the best guarantee that
the substantive designs of the Constitution will be adequately used would be,
interestingly enough, through an originalistapproach.
First things first. In Puerto Rico, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the
existence of a constitutionally-ranked, pro-worker labor policy.,87 The Court's
recognition of the existing policy is mostly based on text and the corresponding
history behind it, notably the Framers' explications.'" The Court's use of history
and original explication reveals the highly ideological nature of the Constitution's labor policies., 89 The effect has been a well-rounded string of cases inter-

preting, constructing and applying the specific labor provisions that take note of
the overarching constitutional policy.19o Even when the relevant constitutional
provision was not at the heart of the question before the Court, it still had a role
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Freire Ayala v. Vista Rent,
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DPR 418, 455-56

(2007); Santini Rivera v. Serv Air, Inc., 137 DPR 1

(1994); Mercado Vega v. UPR, 128 DPR 273 (1991); SIU de PR v. Otis Elevator Co., 105 DPR 832, 843
(1977).

188 Mercado Vega, 128 DPR at 284-85; Dolphin Int'l of P.R. v. Ryder Truck Lines, 127 DPR 869, 87778 (1991) (noting the high priority labor rights received from the Commission on the Bill of Rights);
JRT v. Asoc. Servs. M6dicos Hosp., 115 DPR 360, 365 (1984); Mun. de Guaynabo v. Tribunal Superior,
97 DPR 545, 549-50 (1969); A.D. Miranda, Inc. v. Falc6n, 83 DPR 735, 738-41 (196i).
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Rivera Figueroa v. The Fuller Brush Co., 18o DPR 894, 902 (20); A.D. Miranda, Inc., 83 DPR at
Rivera Padilla v. OAT,
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DPR 315 (2013) (equal pay); Whittenburg v. Col. Ntra. Sra. Del Car-

men, 182 DPR 937, 969 (20n1) (disability insurance); Garcia v. Aljoma, 162 DPR 572 (2004) (protection

from hazardous working conditions); Dolphin Int'l ofP.R., 127 DPR at 869 (right to resign and freely
choose one's occupation); Amy v. Adm. Deporte Hipico, u6 DPR 414 (1985) (right to work); Asoc.
Servs. Midicos Hosp., u5 DPR at 360 (collective bargaining); AAA v. Uni6n Empleados AAA, 105 DPR
437 (1976) (right to strike); Mun. de Guaynabo, 97 DPR at 545 (overtime pay); A.D. Miranda, Inc., 83
DPR at 738 (overtime pay).
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to play, whether as an additionalreason to sustain a holding,'9' or in order to
interpret an ordinary labor statute.'9 2 The end result has been a vigorous judicial
policy favoring labor rights.93
The link between constitutional provisions and statutes in the labor context,
and the use of originalist methodologies, are best exemplified by Rosariov. Toyota.'94 The plaintiff in this case was fired because his employer found out he had a
decades-old prior criminal conviction. Plaintiff sued under the employment antidiscrimination statute, which did not expressly mention criminal convictions,
but it did include social condition. Why is this a constitutional matter? Well, the
statute's ban on discrimination on social condition is a literal copy ofArticle II,
Section I, of the Constitution. It was not a legislative creation. Therefore, the
statutory interpretation analysis required interpreting the constitutionalprovision. That led the Court into original explication territory. Both sides claimed to
be following the original meaning, purpose and intent of the Framers. Puerto
Rican originalism at its best.
The concurrence referenced the history behind the social condition classification. It was not included in the original draft of the Constitution. While being
considered by the Convention, a Socialist delegate proposed that condition be
added to the social origin classification. Because of a generalized agreement
among the delegates, the amendment was adopted without debate; there was no
express explanation on the part of the Framers. But not all was lost. After the
amendment was adopted, a delegate referenced the newly-approved language.
According to him, the new category would prohibit all degradation,favoritism or
prejudice related to a person's extraction, economic position and "status in the
community."95 After quoting from Fern6s Isern's Original Intent and Trias

Monge's ConstitutionalHistory, as well as using a modern dictionary, the concurrence held that the purpose of the social condition category was to protect socially stigmatized persons, such as convicted felons.
The dissent also quoted from the Record of the Convention as its main
source. According to it, the Record showed that the Framers opted for social
condition as a substitute for economic condition, because the former term was
broader than the latter.9 6 Therefore, they argued, the original purpose behind

Emp. Pur. Des., Inc. v. HIE Tel., 150 DPR 924, 929 (2000) (labor protest inside a shopping mall
191
as protected speech); Arroyo v. Rattan Specialties, Inc., 117 DPR 35, 58-59 (1986) (employer's attempted use of polygraph; right to privacy); Rodriguez v. Srio. de Instrucci6n, 1o9 DPR 251 (1979) (free
speech rights of teachers engaged in union organizing); Zachry Int'l v. Tribunal Supremo, 104 DPR
267,

279 (1975) (different working hours for men and women).
Whittenburg, 182 DPR at 937; Diaz v. Wyndham Hotel Corp., 155 DPR 364 (2001); Rodriguez
126 DPR 117 (1990); Garcia PagAn v. Shiley Caribbean, 122 DPR 193
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the term was to protect poor people, not all and any socially stigmatized individual; it was synonymous with social class.
It is difficult to tell who got it right from an originalist perspective, precisely
because the lack of a developed Record and adequate explanation as to the new
term. Furthermore, there seem to be statements supporting each view. The concurrence was able to adopt the expansive reading without being labeled as activist.
Rosariov. Toyota is part of a long list of cases where, because of the slightest
link with labor issues, the Constitution makes an entrance.1 97 Another manifestation of this omnipresence is the clash between constitutional labor rights and
other individual rights. Interestingly enough, in many of these cases, the substantive labor content is severely minimized in the face of the opposing right.198
Labor cases are the main source of anti-originalistdecisions by the Supreme
Court. Living constitutionalism in Puerto Rico has thrived on labor cases. It
would seem that conservative judges find labor-related originalism too much to
bear.199 Most of the time, the Court will only protect the minimum core recognized by the text and Record,zoo sometimes even less.20 This allows for originalist
dissents that blast the Court's minimalist use of labor policy.2oz If the current

Supreme Court really embraces the originalist label, one would think that progressive results in the area of labor rights and policy will follow.
ii. Environmental Policy
Section 19 of Article VI of the Constitution of Puerto Rico reads: "[i]t shall be
the public policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, develop and use its natural
resources in the most effective manner possible for the general welfare of the
community; to conserve and maintain buildings and places declared by the Legislative Assembly to be of historic or artistic value."203 Is this merely aspirational

Asoc. Maestros v. Sist. Retiro Maestros IV, 190 DPR 854 (2014); Dominguez Castro v. ELA 1,
DPR 1 (2010); Pueblo v. Figueroa Jaramillo, 170 DPR 932, 937 (2007) (Rivera Perez, J., concurring).
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198 ELA v. Hermandad de Empleados, 104 DPR 436, 44o (1975) (clash between the right of workers
to protest against their employer and the privacy rights of the employer in his home. The concurrence criticized the majority for failing to accommodate the labor angle); Academia San Jorge v. JRT,
no DPR 193, 234 (1980) (Trias Monge, J., dissenting) (the Court prevented employees at a Catholic
school from organizing a labor union, because the intrusive nature of the state's intervention could
hinder the religious freedoms of the school. The dissent blasted the majority for tilting the balance in
favor of religious rights over labor rights. Both quoted from the Record, but from different pages).
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or justiciable language? The answer was provided by the Framers themselves.
Original explication strikes again.
According to the Supreme Court, "the importance of this constitutional
command must not be undervalued" and it cannot be "reduced to a simple declaration of principles."204 Why? Because when Section 19 was sent to the Convention floor, the delegates responsible for its drafting made sure of it: "[t]here is no
technical error here. We are aware of what we are doing. We are structuring
something, the preservation of natural resources. Puerto Rico is an island. We
should be worried."o Those statements were backed up by the Commission's
Report: "[o]ur goal is to state with absolute clarity the convenience and necessity
of preserving Puerto Rico's natural resources."zo6
These types of statements by the Framers empower the Supreme Court to
develop a judicial policy of environmental protection. According to the Court,
Section 19 "[i]s a protection against the State, society, the government and even
mankind, who in the world today, and without noticing that they are undermining their own existence, destroys nature thanks to rampant consumerism and
materialism, thus creating irreversible systemic imbalances."207 Moreover, the
Court has held that "this provision is not merely an inconsequential statement
nor a declaration of general principles of an exhortative nature. Actually, it is a
command that must be obeyed rigorously and that trumps any statute, rule or
municipal ordinance that is contrary to it."zo8 As a result, Section 19 has two distinct legal effects: (1) it serves as an independent source of law that judges must
use when analyzing the validity of environmental legislation, and (2) it constitutes a prism through which statutes will be analyzed in order to further the
constitutional policy.09 The Court's record putting these words into practice is
mixed.2-o But, it seems difficult to miss the originalist approach to environmental
cases.
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The Ill-fated Section 20 and Other Socio-Economic Rights2 1

For a brief moment, Section 20 was the crown jewel of the Puerto Rico Bill of
Rights and the pride and joy of the Constitutional Convention. It represented the
ultimate codification of the framing generation's progressive agenda and the
principal space for the Constitution's enumeration of socioeconomic rights. It
read:
The Commonwealth also recognizes the existence of the following human rights:
The right of every person to receive free elementary and secondary education.
The right of every person to obtain work.
The right of every person to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, and especially to food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services.

The right of every person to social protection in the event of
unemployment, sickness, old age or disability.
The right of motherhood and childhood to special care and
assistance.

In the light of their duty to achieve the full liberty of the citizen, the people and the government of Puerto Rico shall do everything in their power to promote the greatest possible expansion of
the system of production, to assure the fairest distribution of economic output, and to obtain the maximum understanding between
individual initiative and collective cooperation. The executive and
judicial branches shall bear in mind this duty and shall construe the
laws that tend to fulfill it in the most favorable manner possible.212
Although not meant to be justiciable from the very beginning, Section 20
was not meant to be purely symbolic. It directed legislative action and could
indirectly help courts in their adjudication. But, even as an aspirational provision, Section 20 proved too much for Congress during the Cold War. It was just
too socialist. As a result, even though the People of Puerto Rico had already ratified the Constitution by popular referendum -including Section 20- Congress
forced the Constitutional Convention to meet again and agree to eliminate Section 20. They agreed and the issue was not taken back to the People until after
the Constitution came into effect. Colonialism crept back into the Constitution.
But Section 20 has also crept back in to the Constitution by way of Supreme
Court case law. Its substantive and moral force has made it impossible to simply
leave it in the history books. Its watershed moment was Amy v. Adm. Deporte
211
For a more in-depth look at this issue, see Esther Vicente Rivera, Una mirada a la interpretacidn dc los dercchos ccon6micos, sociales y culturalesen las decisiones del TribunalSupremo de Puerto
Rico, 44 REv. JUR. UIPR 17 (2010).

212

2 DIARIO DE SESIONES DE LA CONVENCION CONSTITUYENTE 1103 (1952).

Vol. 85

REVISTA JURIDICA UPR

256

Hipico, where the Court revived Section
retain work:

20'S

promise of a right to obtain and

The right to a job, that is, to generate income and to have a just and decent
life, is an inalienable value of man that predates the most ancient of all known
constitutions. The uncertain destiny of the ill-fated Section 20 of our Constitution lives within those rights that, even if not expressly mentioned in the text,
the People retain against the established political power. 13
2

Later developments in the case law point to the possibility of giving real force to
symbolic rights of this nature, 214 or, at least, recognize their existence.215 The story of Section 20 is still on-going and so is the potential for the remaining, justiciable socio-economic rights in the constitutional text. The text and history are
there; it is just a matter of a court willing to use them.
V.

IT

ALL

COMES

TOGETHER:

CONSTITUTIONALIST

RHETORIC

ORIGINALIST
AND

METHODS,

ORDINARY

LIVING

CANONS

OF

CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

Not every constitutional case requires an in-depth look into history, intent
or purpose. But originalist methods, even if only superficially, are always there.
The same goes for the rhetoric of living constitutionalism. Finally, one of the
most interesting aspects of Puerto Rico's Supreme Court practice has been constitutionalcases where the Court splits down the middle and both sides engage in
originalistmethods of interpretationand construction. Such has been and continues to be the power of Puerto Rico's original explication originalism.
A. PuertoRico's Multiple HellerMoments
Much has been said in the U.S. about the fact that both the majority and dissenting opinions in District of Columbia v. Heller engaged in some sort of
originalist methodologies, with the former focusing on original public meaning
and the latter on original purpose., 6 Yet Heller-type situations have been around
in Puerto Rico for sixty years.217 But aren't clear text, authoritative explications
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and entrenched policy choices supposed to prevent all that? Most of the time the
answer is yes. But that is not the point: modern constitutions accompanied by
original explications theory are not perfect tools. It would be foolish to argue
that they are and incorrect to discard them because of it. Heller itself is the perfect example. Heller was not a defeat of originalism because it proved that the
same sort of method can create different results; it was a victory for originalism
because it created a common method of constitutional adjudication. We do not
know if Heller is an outlier in U.S. Supreme Court practice. What we do know is
that in Puerto Rico it is the norm, and that speaks volumes to the success of the
Framers' designs.
The most dramatic Heller moment in Puerto Rico was In re Aprob. Rs. y
Com. Esp. Ind. '8 Like Heller, this case was highly political. Unlike Heller, it was
not about rights or policy. It was about power: who has ultimate administrative
power over the Judicial Branch? The Court as a whole or the Chief Justice exclusively? Both sides resorted to text and authoritative explications. As an empirical
mater, it would seem like the majority focused more on text and the dissenters
on history, but both claimed to be following the Framers' intent.
B. Non-OriginalistConstitutionalAdjudication
Originalism is not a magic wand nor is it the exclusive tool of constitutional
adjudication. Other devices also play a part: doctrine, precedent, classic canons
of interpretation, and so on. In some instances, the case is so simple or the question so narrow as to not warrant a historical analysis of the applicable constitutional provision. Little or no mention of the Framers' intent or explications has
sometimes been made, be it because it is unnecessary, 19 or because the precedents that serve as authority already did the correspondinghistoricalinquiry into
intent and explication.-zo A survey of Supreme Court cases reveals that original
explication is the principal methodological tool used in terms of quantity and in
relation to the relative importance of the question before the Court. Precedent
and doctrine-based decisions are fewer in number and mostly relate to less controversial issues.
Finally, there is the issue of the Constitution's textual command about its
own interpretationand construction, articulated in Article II, Section 19, of the
Constitution.221 Several surprising things emerge from the Supreme Court's practice as to this issue. First, it's the lack of express use of this provision.222 While
2

Pueblo v. Santiago Feliciano, 139 DPR 361 (1995); P.R. Tel. Co. v. Martinez, 114 DPR 328 (1983); UTIER
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one could argue that the Court has constantly made use of this command, there
have been scarce occasions in which the Court explicitly mentions it. The endresult is quite anti-climactic: Section 19 has had a negligible official role. But
maybe the key lies elsewhere: the text, history and substantive content of the
Constitution has made reference to Section 19 unnecessary or even superfluous.
And that is quite a story indeed.
C. Living ConstitutionalistRhetoric
Puerto Rico has not been a stranger to living constitutionalism rhetoric. And
there are reasons for this. First, because of the progressivesubstantive nature of
our Constitution, some Justices, influenced by the U.S. dichotomy of originalistas-conservative and living-constitutionalists-as-liberals, have felt that the latter
is the more adequate method for Puerto Rican constitutional law. Section 19
adds to this because it expressly requires liberal construction of rights provisions
and an expansive method of interpretation that is actually rooted in originalism.
Second, because Puerto Rican jurisprudence has yet to articulate the interpretation-construction distinction, 223 expansive construction is mistakenly seen as a
necessary product of living constitutionalism.
But once one makes the interpretation-construction distinction and recognizes that expansive legal effect based on adequate originalist interpretation is
not anathema to originalism, the picture changes. The Court's concern that
originalism-equals-stagnation is misplaced and its use of living constitutionalist
rhetoric should be seen in its appropriate context. The more one looks at it, the
more one can conclude that living constitutionalist rhetoric in Puerto Rico is
simply mislabeled expansive construction which the text and history of the Constitution allows and even requires.
As early as 1961, the Supreme Court emphasized that, since language is
adopted because of historical and social factors, constitutional interpretation
requires a look at both the historical context of the language when adopted, as
well as the context "of current reality."4 Thus, started the road of references to
updating and currentness as elements to consider in constitutional adjudication.
But this first quote fits perfectly into the interpretation-construction distinction,
in which the meaning of words traces back to the historical moment of its adoption, while the effect it is to be given in the present applies to current realities.
Probably the first case where appeals to current social circumstances arguably clashed with the Framers' intent was in AAA v. Uni6n Empleados AAA.-5
There the Supreme Court, after spending several pages going in to the history of
the right to strike in Puerto Rico -including the Framers' insistence that this
right could only be restricted in the most urgent of circumstances-, declared
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unconstitutional a statute that a priori prohibited any strike in the state-owned
water corporation. Yet, in a few sentences, the Court says enough is enough and
issues an injunction to stop the strike, partially circumventing the Framers. In
fact, the opinion reveals the Court's substantive stand on strikes, stating that
society is not unarmed in the face of a paralyzing (that is, effective) strike.22 6 By
emphasizing the need to understand the right to strike in its historicalperspective, the Supreme Court looked to the present. Living constitutionalist rhetoric
was not far behind: "[t]he Constitutional Convention did not limit itself in Section 18, as it relates to this dynamic field, to elevating current law [about the
right to strike] to constitutional status, to mummifying it and to establish its
reignfor decades, with its ancientobjectives and terms."-7 Still, the Court stated:
"[1]et's examine the debates [on the Convention floor]."" You cannot escape the
Framers that easily. Actually, the Court was careful and emphasized that its
statements about updating and change were not decisive. Instead, it alleged that
the Framers' explications were on its side. Moreover, the Court insisted that the
right to strike remains as strong as it ever was.
The author of the Court's opinion in AAA v. Uni6n EmpleadosAAA was Chief
Justice Trias Monge, Puerto Rico's eminent living constitutionalist. It was he who
emphasized that many constitutional provisions, as a linguistic fact, are concepts
that have "partially determinate content," that are also "partially flexible or variable, subject to the general process of change that affects law."-9 According to
Trias Monge, "[o]ur obligation is to obey the constitutional command, in accordance with the other provisions of our Constitution and the needs of the country."23o He is the primary source of reference to "the values of a changing society,"23' or to the Constitution as a "living organism."232 But he, like the rest of the
Court, always looked to the Framers' explications. He updated the text by applying it, not by re-defining it. His holding in FigueroaFerrerthat the right to privacy prohibits the Government from forcing married people to stay together even
when both spouses want to divorce, reflects his view that constitutions must be
relevant to current problems.
Justice Negr6n Garcia also shared this approach: the Constitution means at
least what it says, but it can mean so much more, depending on current social
needs. His views about what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment are an
example of this.233 Like Trias Monge, he must still pay heed to the Framers.234
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According to Justice Fiol Matta, "[o]ur Constitution is not an exact map. On
the contrary, it offers coordinates."235 The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has also

referred to the Constitution as:
[A] document that transcends the personal preferences of its authors and it articulates the hopes of future generations. Its breadth is modern, its language
clear and simple, open to continued renovation. It is not written in an extinct
tongue, hard to define or related to esoteric issues. We are interpreting a Constitution, not the Dead Sea Scrolls.23 6
According to Justice HernAndez Denton, "[i]n the modern State, the Constitution is a document which possesses great dynamism and it creates a political
structure for present and future generations. Its vitality and durability depend on
its capability to define a People's fundamental values across time."37 Such has
been the living constitutionalist rhetoric.
Justice HernAndez Denton has probably been the one who has attempted to
emulate Trias Monge and Negr6n Garcia's approach the most. He constantly
emphasized the Constitution's "dynamism" in order to ensure its current "vitality."238 According to him, when "interpreting the contours of the Constitution of

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico we must guarantee its vitality and relevance
to the socioeconomic and political problems of our times."239 He has been the
closest in proposing that the meaning of the Constitution is subject to change:
"[w]e must also avoid that inflexible interpretations and attachments to antiquated models impede the applicability [of the Constitution] to future events so
that in a few years the Constitution, designed to guide the life of a People for
several centuries, turns obsolete."24o
But, notwithstanding florid language to the contrary, the Court has mainly
limited its use of living constitutionalist tools to making sure that the Constitution is constructedin a way that is relevant to current social needs, which simply
234
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takes us back to the interpretation-construction distinction that strengthens,
instead of weakening, originalism.2 Rhetoric aside, the Framers still carry the
day.
i. Separation of Powers Revisited and a Final Example
Liberal democratic models of representative government and the separation
of powers have created a limited role for the judiciary. Courts basically serve
three functions: adjudicators of specific controversies among parties, statutory
interpretation and constitutional adjudication. The separation of powers doctrine is premised, mainly, on the operation of a framework constitutional structure. The courts have limited roles because the constitutions they interpret, con
struct and apply are themselves limited. These constitutions seem to require a
passive and limited role for courts. In terms of constitutional controversies, unless the constitution specifically requires judicial intervention, courts should
butt out. Passive constitutions require and create passive courts. But what about
active constitutions that make up the core of modern constitutionalism? Popular
sovereignty and constitutional supremacy are not mutually exclusive concepts,
even if the latter is accompanied by judicial enforcement. At some point, concepts normally associated with the separation of powers doctrine such as deference to the elected branches, abstaining from going into issues of policy, political questions, minimalism, and so on, must be either re-evaluated or complemented by new concepts.
The point of originalism is to constrain courts, protecting democracy from
rogue courts that substitute democratically adopted policy for their own. But the
situation in teleological or ideological constitutions is different: in those circumstances, when courts faithfully apply the substantivecontent of the constitution,
they are simultaneously constrained and active: constrained as to picking policy,
but active as to putting constitutional policy into practice. We must not forget
that one of the goals of teleological constitutionalism is to empower the People
to govern themselves, not just through an active political process that results in
legislative action, but through the constitution itself When that happens, courts,
as the ultimate interpreters of the constitution, become governing bodies. That
is not a choice made by power hungry judges; it is a fail-safe desired by the People in case ordinary politics fail. New constitutions need new models for the judicial role. Classic notions of the separation of powers are simply inadequate.
The gap between how courts see their own roles and the role assigned to them
by ideological constitutions is the final frontier.
The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has not always shied away from its expanded constitutional role. When it feels backed by text and intent, the Court
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feels free to state that its intervention in cases dealing with substantive policy is
not law-making but constitutional adjudication.4
But ever since the Court's landmark, and most unoriginalist,decision in ELA
v. Aguayo, it has been quite difficult to shed off the chains of classic separation of
powers concepts. 243 ELA v. Aguayo is an existential mess. On the one hand, it is a
non-textualist, un-originalist and activist decision. On the other hand, its substantive result is passive and restrained. Here, the Court incorporated the classic
concepts of justiciability, case or controversy, political questions, and standing,
among others. By doing so, it established a very narrow role for courts. Yet, the
decision itself was wholly activist: there is absolutely no provision in the Constitution that required this result. On the contrary, it based its decision on classic
notions of constitutionalism. Through an activist move, the Court became passive. Puerto Rico's substantive Constitution has been paying the price ever since.
Any future Court that has wanted to justify a narrow, deferential, minimalist and
passive decision in the face of legislative action has always been able to trace
back to ELA v. Aguayo and to the principle of the separation of powers,-4 since
they can hardly trace back to text. But ELA v. Aguayo has not been the end of the
story either. The Court can always count on the text and history of the Constitution, as well as its policy implications, to allow it to transcend the shacldes of the
separation of powers.
One of the interesting results of the tension between classic separation of
powers concerns and the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's acknowledgment of its
own political power under the Constitution is that the political question doctrine
is very different than in the federal system, with more and more questions being
susceptible to judicial adjudication.245 Still, some current justices of the Supreme
Court appear to take separation of powers doctrine, particularly its more classic
articulations, as a given and then work back from that.4 6 The end-result is a
more passive Court and a less active Constitution. The surprising part is that
these views are held by the same Justices that self-proclaim as originalists, when
the Framers' intent was, precisely, to adopt an active Constitution. While in the
U.S. originalism and classic notions of the separation of powers seem to go hand
in hand, that link is neither natural nor inherent; it is content contingent. In
Puerto Rico, that content breaks the link: originalism is inherently interventionist.
The promise of Puerto Rican originalism is to expand the reach of the Constitution. The safety provided by Puerto Rican originalism is that it protects an
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irreducible core. Judges have occupied the middle-ground. Courts can opt for the
minimalist approach and only rule proactively when the constitutional text and
the Framers' explications are on-point. This is a sort of core-originalism.But inherent in Puerto Rican originalism is the notion that attention to the core is not
enough. The Framers invite or even command courts to always look beyond the
core. When courts engage in pro-active adjudication, the issue of legitimacy can
be easily dispensed by reference to the text and history of the Constitution. The
Court's history is full of this minimalist-maximalist dichotomy.247

Finally, I wish to discuss a very particular constitutional issue that neatly
captures all the issues discussed previously. I refer to the constitutional prohibition on discrimination on account of birth and its relation with the rights of
children born out of wedlock.
One of the burning issues before the adoption of the Constitution in 1952
was the blatant discrimination faced by children born out of wedlock, particularly the rights of children that resulted from adulterous relationships, many of
which were functioning family units where the father, because of social and economic pressures, did not or could not divorce his legal spouse. The legal system
in Puerto Rico, particularly the Civil Code inspired by Spanish law, still distinguished children between so-called legitimate and natural offspring. Besides the
social stigma created by the use of those terms, the legal system treated these
children differently. As most relevant here, these differences included not being
able to carry their fathers' surnames or not participating in their estates.
Section i of the Bill of Rights expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis
of birth.4 8 The Record of the Constitutional Convention makes absolutely clear
that the purpose and goal behind this particular classification was to "eliminate
the legal stigma of children born out of wedlock [and give] all children equal
status in relation to their parents and the legal system."249 Shortly after the Constitution was adopted, the Legislature gave equal legal status to children born
after 1952. But, what about all those children born before 1952? Well, the text
would appear to be clear: no discrimination. But there was a problem. The Report by the Commission on the Bill of Rights stated: "[a]s to estates and properties, the changes required by this provision shall not be retroactive to births that
occurred before the [adoption of the Constitution]."25o That is, the new constitutional provision would only protect children born after 1952. All those born be-
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fore that date and whose parents died after 1952 were still excluded from their
inheritance.
The Framers' explications and intent could not be clearer. As a result, the
Supreme Court obliged. For the first couple of years after the adoption of the
Constitution, the Court mainly limited itself to giving these children only the
right to bear the fathers' surnames. The only obstacle to giving these children
full equality was the clear text of the Report.251 As much as the Court wanted to
extend equality to these children, the Report simply "left no doubt" as to the
prospective nature of the provision.252
But the gap between the constitutional promise and the injustice still facing
all these children born before 1952 was too much to bear. The Court began to
crack. The rebellion started in 1961, nearly a decade after the Constitution proclaimed the inviolable nature of human dignity. To the challengers, the text of
the Constitution was absolutely clear "no matter when it was adopted or when
the birth took place, or what laws established" before 1952.253 In his concurring
opinion, Santana Becerra added:
When it comes to the essential equality of people that the constitutional
declaration searches for, I cannot conceive of a rule of law that applies that constitutional provision in terms of [discrimination on account of] birth, only to
those who were born after its adoption, which implies a reservation as to its effectiveness and validity which neither its text nor its spirit includes and that allows a regime of inequality and indignity to continue for several generations until they extinguish themselves through the natural process of their disappearance. 25

Finally, the Court followed suit in one of the most celebrated cases in Puerto
Rican history, akin to the Brown case in the U.S. In Ocasio v. Diaz, the Supreme
Court held that the constitutional prohibition of discrimination on account of
birth protected those children who were born before 1952 but whose parents
died after the adoption of the Constitution. Well aware that it was going against
the express explications of the Framers, the Court treaded carefully and used
every argument at its disposal.
First, it concluded that, as a matter of inheritance law in Puerto Rico, the
rights of children with respect to their parents' estates do not accrue at their
birth but at the death of their parents. When the children were born was irrelevant. The only appropriate question was when their parents died. Second, the
Court emphasized the broad purpose and the expansive principle behind the
constitutional prohibition. Third, the Court went on the textualist offensive: the
constitutional text makes no reference to dates which would limit the scope of
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its protection to only births that occurred after them. If the Framers wanted the
prohibition to apply only to births that took place after 1952, they should have
written that into the Constitution. Finally, the Court confronted the explicit
statement included in the Report. Then it really went to work. It concluded that
the Report was actually wrong. They could not have meant births that took place
before 1952. Because of the previously mentioned particularity of Puerto Rican
estate law, the correct term had to be deaths instead of births. That is, that Section i would not apply to situations where the parent died before the adoption of
the Constitution, where, presumably, the estate had already been divided up.
The Court felt it was better to re-write the Report than to ignore it. But in the
end, the Court made itself clear. Even if the Report meant births instead of
deaths, "[t]he delegates did not follow the recommendations of the Report when
they adopted the Constitution. They did not include in it any reference that a
child born before the 2 5 th of July of 1952 could not inherit or be treated equally
for purposes of the estate."255

Ocasio v. Diaz is probably the only case in Puerto Rican history where the
Court reached a result that contradicted the express statements of the Framers.
Without a doubt, this case stands out because of the substantive justice it granted. The Constitution must mean what it says. The promise of equality, respect,
and dignity cannot be accompanied by an asterisk.
VI. FINAL THOUGHTS

The Constitution of Puerto Rico is not a revolutionary document. It represents the high-water mark of liberal democratic constitutionalism and its natural
fusion with social-democratic thought. Its protection of important socioeconomic rights and the clarity of many of its policy provisions signal the start of
a new trend in modern constitutionalism. The creation of the Constitution was a
social process; a self-constituted People that decided to articulate their blueprint
for society not just through the Constitution but in the Constitution. Although
Puerto Rico, because of the enduring nature of its colonial relation with the U.S.,
still has a long way to go in the road of self-determination, the Constitution represents a crucial step in that direction. The People did not trust Congress, courts,
legislatures or national elites: they trusted themselves. Because of the radically
democratic nature of the constitution-making process, the People had the opportunity to protect themselves from potential failures in the ordinary political
process. And so they did, through the adoption of clear text, authoritative explications by those charged with drafting it, and by including a whole array of matters ranging from the organization of Government and the recognition of political rights, to socio-economic policy matters. It is a Constitution that still has a

Ocasio v. Diaz, 88 DPR 676, 735 (1963) (emphasis added) (translation by the author). The
255
Court was not unanimous. The dissent emphasized that when the Court basically re-wrote the Report, they were admitting its authoritative nature. Id. at 784 (Perez Pimentel, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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lot of potential. All that is needed are courts willing to give it life. Maybe a
method of original explication is the way to go. So far, it has served us well.
Maybe Puerto Rico has something to teach us all.

